I think there’s been a real shift in the conventional wisdom about whether the global economy’s long-term problem is one of insufficient demand or supply. Prior to the pandemic, there was a broad consensus among economists that the economy was suffering from a chronic lack of demand, or “secular stagnation.” But now, in the wake of inflation, analysts at BlackRock and Allianz have been suggesting the opposite: that we’re entering a new era of persistent supply constraints. They argue that aging populations in developed countries are shrinking the supply of labor more than they’re shrinking demand, that the green transition will demand lots of commodities and labor, and that deglobalization will make supply chains less efficient. And all this will make inflation a bigger problem than growth. I take it you reject that narrative?
It could happen in the short term. If you start to see a reduction in Chinese net-supply and an increase in infrastructure investment in the U.S. That could put some pressure on prices. But remember, the purpose of infrastructure spending is not to boost demand; it’s to boost supply. And if it’s done correctly, you boost demand at first and then later on you increase supply by more than the increase in demand. So thinking long term, whatever the short-term impacts of an adjustment in China are, what really matters is whether we get back to a period of more rapid growth. And one of the things we have to remember, including from our own history, is that productivity growth is often a function of wage growth. In the U.S. in the 19th century, when you had massive increases in labor productivity, that probably wasn’t unrelated to the fact that American wages were the highest in the world.

So investors had a strong incentive to invest in labor-saving technology. Right. And then, in the last 30 years, we’ve seen a simultaneous slowdown in productivity growth and wage growth. Labor is cheap in the U.S., relative to its productivity. And it’s even cheaper in places like Vietnam or China or Germany. As a result, the way to increase profits is to shift into lower-wage environments, rather than to invest in productivity-increasing technology.

So do we want a world where businesses increase profits by putting downward pressure on wages? Or do we want a world where businesses increase profits by putting upward pressure on labor productivity? I think clearly we want the latter. The transition isn’t going to be easy. But I think that’s the path we need to get back on. The path that we haven’t been following for the last three, four decades.

Even though the country will eventually be faced with the challenge of supporting a very large retired population with a much smaller working one?
Don’t get me wrong, that is a problem. If you’ve got more retired people relative to the number of workers, then that means you need to transfer more income away from workers in order to keep the retired people alive. But that’s a problem many countries have. The U.S. is sort of lucky, but almost every rich country has that problem. Japan has that problem. Spain and Italy have that problem, and we don’t think of it as a collapse in those countries. So I don’t think we should think of it as a collapse in China. It will make China less of a geopolitical power. But it’s just not a big deal from an economic point of view.

Speaking of geopolitics: As tensions between China and the U.S. have risen, America and its allies have sought to reduce their reliance on Chinese commodities, inputs, and goods. For the moment, it’s unclear what the scale of this “decoupling” will actually be in practice. How big a threat does that pose to Chinese manufacturers?
Well, for all the talk of decoupling and tariffs on Chinese goods, the American trade deficit has widened to its greatest level since just before the 2008 crisis. And the Chinese trade surplus has also widened to its greatest amount in history as a share of GDP. So I think a lot of that is based on a real misunderstanding of trade patterns. People think that you have this discretionary ability to buy from wherever you want. But it doesn’t really work that way. Remember that Chinese exports are among the most competitive in the world. Why is that? It’s not because the Chinese are particularly hardworking or China has particular comparative advantages beyond size. The reason is that all of these transfers from the household sector to manufacturers, both implicit and explicit, to subsidize manufacturing and investment makes Chinese labor cheap relative to its productivity.

And that’s true not just of China but of Germany, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Japan. All of these countries that run persistent trade surpluses do so because of the very low household share of GDP; workers get paid less relative to their productivity than among their trading partners. So as long as that’s the case, it doesn’t matter whether you want to have operations in China or not. Whoever does have operations there will be more competitive and its market share will expand. So I’m very skeptical about this decoupling idea. I think it’s going to take a very different understanding of the way trade works in the modern environment before that can happen.

How do China’s economic difficulties impact American consumers and workers? And how will its current policy trajectory impact the U.S. economy this year?
It depends on whether or not China rebalances. I mean this whole issue of rebalancing is so extreme in China, the most extreme in world history, that almost everything, the answer to almost every question depends on how it rebalances.

But what’s your view for the most likely scenario in 2023?
I’m hoping that they are genuinely able to boost the consumption share of GDP. There will be a boost this year, a partial reversal of all the awful stuff that happened last year. But I’m hoping it’s a permanent increase in the consumption share of GDP, in which case Chinese growth will slow significantly as they move away from overspending on the investment side. But that will also mean that Chinese households will consume a larger share of what they produce. Which would be good for the global economy, since it would increase global demand.

Wouldn’t that be bad for inflation though? Given the global economy’s supply constraints, wouldn’t an increase in global demand lead to higher prices?
There’s a very complicated argument about the causes of inflation in the U.S. and in the rest of the world and how long this is going to persist. So it depends on all of those issues. But at the end of the day, the world suffers from more of a demand-side problem than a supply-side problem. COVID temporarily interrupted that because it had a significant supply-side impact. But assuming that we’re getting away from COVID and back to more normal conditions, we’ll soon be worrying more about demand than supply. And China has been a huge absorber of global demand. So as its trade surplus contracts, it will absorb less net-demand from abroad, which will be positive for growth.

The flip side, of course, is that reversing the direction of subsidies would really hurt manufacturers and exporters. So what’s good for China in the medium and long term may be quite painful in the short term. And again, this isn’t a Chinese problem. The Japanese have been saying the same thing for 30 years: “We have to boost consumption, but we must boost consumption without hurting the export sector.” And that’s a problem because boosting domestic demand will hurt the export sector in the beginning. So they never end up doing it.

Last week, the Chinese government revealed that its population contracted in 2022 for the first time in six decades. And that trend will only accelerate in the coming decades, as the pre-one-child policy generation gives way to its successors. Many analysts have suggested that this will have devastating consequences for the Chinese economy. But you’ve suggested that such talk is “overexcited” and that China could largely resolve its demographic problem by addressing income inequality.
I think people are confusing the geopolitics of economic growth with economic growth. Now, if the Chinese population declines, will it be a smaller economy relative to what it could have been? Yeah, of course. If you cut the United States in half, you’ll have two countries with half the population and half the GDP.

But what really matters for people is their income. People don’t care what national GDP is; they care about their income growth. Now, the population is contracting very slowly. There’s nothing special about this year. It doesn’t really matter that some people think that this year is the first year that the population actually went down. It could have been last year, it could be next year, we’re not really sure. But the population change year-to-year is very small.

In any case, a smaller population does not need to mean weaker demand. Demand is equal to the number of people times their income, minus their savings. So if the population drops slowly by half a percent, but you can increase household income by 2, or 3, or 4 percent, then demand will go up. It won’t go down.

So the key for China, in almost all of its problems, is this redistribution of income. And since Chinese households currently receive a historically low share of income, there’s a lot of room to grow the household share of GDP.

A falling population is a problem for China as a military power. But if you’re thinking about the Chinese economy, it’s much less of a problem.

And the pain is really brutal this time because they really clamped down on it. And it’s particularly brutal for local governments because they’ve depended heavily on land sales for their revenues to pay for everything. And they’re being so heavily squeezed that they’re cutting their expenses, reducing salaries, doing all the things that they shouldn’t be doing, but they don’t have a choice. So now Beijing is trying to “stabilize” the property bubble without reviving it. They want to slow down the contraction.

But we’ve never really seen that happen in a highly speculative market. It keeps going up until it starts to go down, and once it goes down, it’s very hard to get it to stabilize. Speculative markets go up or they go down; they don’t do stability. So there’s a real big question as to whether or not Beijing will indeed be able to stabilize them.

In addition to the problems in the property sector, China also faces really high youth unemployment with nearly one-fifth of young urban workers going jobless. Does that problem also trace back to China’s broken growth model, or is it a function of Xi’s crackdown on the tech sector or other issues?
It has to do with the original problems of the growth model. The private sector, and particularly the service sector, is starved of demand. If you go out and talk to local businesses and you ask them, “What’s your problem?” they’ll tell you the problem is that no one is buying anything and they haven’t been for years. COVID just made it worse. So what you really should be doing is demand-side policies like the U.S. and Europe did in response to COVID. But for ideological and institutional reasons, China just doesn’t seem able to do demand-side policies. So they respond with supply-side ones.

If you listen to the ministries of Commerce or Industry or Transportation, they’re all saying the same thing. The way to get out of this mess — the way to regain growth — is to keep spending more, supporting manufacturers, and building more infrastructure. Which is another way of saying we need to continue subsidizing the supply side of the economy. The problem with subsidies is that they’re just transfers. If you get subsidized, then I must pay for it. And so, effectively, these supply-side policies require implicit transfers from the household sector. For example, a weak currency hurts households, who are importers, in favor of manufacturers, who are exporters. Low interest rates hurt households who are net savers in favor of, again, manufacturers who are net borrowers, et cetera. So these types of policies end up supporting the wrong part of the economy.

Xi’s government is also quite aware of the problems in China’s property sector. And it’s made some efforts to temper its growth by restricting credit. But in recent weeks, the CCP has walked back some of those restrictions. Why did they change course?
The first thing is to understand how out of control the property sector became. The direct and indirect share of GDP attributable to the property sector is estimated to be between 25 and 30 percent, which is twice the level in other countries. Real-estate prices are equal to between 300 and 350 percent of GDP, which is two and a half to three times what it is in other countries. When you look at household savings, the real-estate component of household savings is between 60 and 70 percent, which is more than twice what it is in other countries. Real estate is always important in any economy. But in China, it is far more important. And this has happened over 20 to 30 years of rapid property expansion and rapid increases in real-estate prices.

When a boom lasts that long, it changes behavior. Whether you’re a business or a household or a bank, you learn to bet on continued expansion in the property sector. If you don’t learn that, you get put out of business. Households that borrow too much and buy too many apartments, instead of getting punished, end up becoming incredibly successful. Property developers that find every way they can to borrow money — including ways that are technically illegal — and use it to buy land outperform the more prudent property developers.

Banks that lend too much to real estate, and even cut corners to do so, are the really successful banks. And those that don’t do that lose market share. So eventually, after so many years, much of the economy is implicitly betting on continued expansion in the property sector. This is not just a Chinese problem. We saw this in Japan and in the U.S. and Spain before the financial crisis.

So when you try to bring the property sector under control, you are reversing this entire process. And that means everybody — households, banks, businesses, local governments — suffer enormously from any attempt to bring the property sector under control. And the pain is so great at some point they try to back away.

This was not the first time that they went after the property sector, although it has been the most aggressive attempt. They’ve gone after it many times before in the last five to six years. But they always pull back when they see the pain.

So to be clear: China has a growth model that suppresses consumption in order to direct more money toward investment in infrastructure and capital-intensive projects. In the early stages of this model, when China was sorely lacking in infrastructure and housing, this was a very sound approach. But now they’ve reached a point where they’ve picked all the low-hanging fruit. And opportunities for productive investment are actually constrained by the fact that consumer demand is weak, since the household share of income is low. So the government starts investing in projects with little actual utility. And that produces a massive bubble in the property sector.
In the property sector and in infrastructure.

And the specific “adjustment” that they need to make is to redistribute income away from businesses and toward household consumption by promoting higher wages or social-welfare programs?
Exactly. Now, in most countries, almost all income is divided between households and businesses. In China, however, a substantial share of income actually goes to local governments. So technically, the way to solve the Chinese problem is not so much by redistributing from businesses to households but rather redistributing from local governments to the household sector. But, of course, the fact that local governments currently take in a lot of income makes them very powerful. And local elites are dependent on the growth of local government spending.

You’ve written that the Chinese Communist Party is aware of the problem and officially wants to increase consumption. To the lay American, it might seem strange that a one-party government would find it politically difficult to enact a policy that, effectively, makes the vast majority of the population richer. Why can’t a state that has authoritarian powers enact an agenda that has broad popular support?
If you redistribute income from local governments to the household sector, that’ll certainly make households very happy. But it will be very painful for local governments. Right now, you could argue that households retain roughly 60 percent of GDP while governments and businesses each retain roughly 20 percent. So one way of looking at it is that households retain about three times the income share that governments do.

In order for China to be — not even a normal country — but a normal low-consuming country, they would need to transfer at least 10 to 15 percentage points of GDP from governments to households. So, at the end of this transfer, households retain not 60 but 70 to 75 percent of GDP, and governments no longer retain 20 but rather 5 to 10 percent. That means the ratio of household income to government income goes up by seven, eight, nine, ten times.

Well, you cannot have such a massive redistribution in relative income without a massive redistribution in relative political power. And again, it is the very ability of local governments to fund enormous amounts of spending that has basically created a lot of local political, business, and financial elites.

There’s a stereotype that to be a millionaire in China, you have to write computer code. But that’s not true. The vast majority of rich Chinese are rich because they were in the property sector or in the construction sector or in other basic parts of the economy that receive lots of government spending. So adjustment requires a major transformation in all of the business, political, and financial institutions that have developed over the last 30 years.

You could argue that the centralization of power under Xi Jinping might be necessary in order to force through such transformations. But certainly those adjustments are not happening yet. We’ve been talking about them for 15 years, but they haven’t happened.

The economist Albert Hirschman wrote about this way back in the 1970s. A successful growth model will disproportionately benefit certain constituencies. And it will also make those constituencies disproportionately powerful. Which makes it politically difficult to shift away from the model after it’s become obsolete. So you end up following an outdated economic strategy. What happens is that you try to keep rapid, investment-driven growth going after you’ve exhausted every easy opportunity for productive investment. So you fund nonproductive investments. And then you see debt start to rise. This happened in China between 2006 and 2008.

And debt continues rising until either you decide to adjust or you’re forced by debt constraints into adjusting. And adjustment is always very, very difficult.

So the reason COVID matters is because, if you look at all of the indicators, the consumption share of GDP got even worse during the COVID period, while debt rose very rapidly. And the share of growth attributable to nonproductive investments in the property sector and infrastructure grew. So, COVID accelerated all of the problems China already had. This year, and for many years to come, what China really has to do is find a way to adjust.

We spoke last week about China’s obsolete economic strategy, the growing conflict between Beijing and local government elites, the nation’s declining population, and why Joe Biden’s most nationalistic economic policies are actually “trade-enhancing,” among other things.

What is the biggest headwind facing China’s economy in 2023?
In order to understand what China’s facing today, you really have to look beyond the past two years. COVID did not change the Chinese economy so much as it exacerbated its underlying problems, which are at least a decade old.

Those problems are most visible in the property sector. But they derive from China’s growth model. That model has two parts. First, through a variety of policies, you increase the share of national income that goes into savings and reduce the share that goes into consumption. In practice, this means restricting the amount of GDP that goes to households and increasing the amount that goes to businesses. Second, you channel those savings through the banking system into investment.

This model is not unique to China. Quite a number of countries have followed it. China has just followed it to a greater extent than any country in history.

Is it a good model or a bad model? Well, it depends on the underlying circumstances. When China started this, it was among the most underinvested economies in the world. After five decades of anti-Japanese war, civil war, and Maoism, it was hugely underinvested. So this model was exactly what it needed. Opportunities for productive investment were abundant.

But the trouble with a very successful development model is that, by definition, it resolves the problems it was created to address. A good development model renders itself obsolete. And yet, if such a model eliminates its animating purpose, it does not eliminate the interest groups who’ve come to benefit from it.

FOREIGN INTERESTS JAN. 24, 2023
China’s Economic Model Is in Crisis (and Xi Knows It)

The world’s second-largest economy is awakening from a yearslong stupor. Since the pandemic’s onset, China’s “Zero COVID” policy has imposed harsh side effects on its commerce. Now, the nation’s most stringent public-health regulations are over. But its economy’s worrisome symptoms persist.

China’s grotesquely overinflated property bubble is at perpetual risk of bursting. A youth-unemployment crisis plagues its major cities. A perennially underpaid labor force is struggling to prop up consumer demand. And the demographic collapse wrought by the one-child policy has just begun.

What happens in China does not stay there. The economic trajectory of the world’s most populous country has profound implications for its trade partners and geopolitical rivals. To get a better understanding of what’s ailing the Chinese economy — and what could plausibly heal it — I reached out to Michael Pettis, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A former Wall Street trader, Pettis is a longtime critic of China’s growth model. In his 2020 book Trade Wars Are Class Wars, co-authored with the journalist Matthew Klein, Pettis argued that China’s economic policies increase global inequality and reduce American prosperity.

India and Asean countries are rising .............. u r sleeping.

But it adds that a sharp slowdown in home sales would place a huge strain on developers’ cash flows, forcing many out of business.

In turn, a surge in real estate insolvencies would result in people losing their jobs, or at least part of their income, which would reduce demand for housing.

What’s more, a fall in property prices will leave households and corporates with less capacity to borrow, which could reduce credit growth.

The paper warns that because real estate is so closely linked to other sectors of the economy, such as construction and demand for household appliances and furnishings, “a reduction in housing activities may contribute to a downward spiral in the economy, leading to further declines in employment, income, consumption and investment”.

High vacancy rates
“Real estate and construction are also crucial for job creation, making up around 20 per cent of urban non-private employment.”

But there are worrying signs – such as high vacancy rates and the existence of “ghost cities” – that China could be grappling with an excess supply of housing.

“It is sobering to recall that US regulators never expected that housing prices would fall by 36 per cent from peak to trough ... even the very cautious pragmatic Chinese regulators may not yet be fully anticipating the depth of the possible fall in China’s housing prices.”

The paper notes that because Chinese local governments are heavily dependent on land sales to earn revenue, and because many companies rely on real estate as collateral for their borrowings, “even modestly declining prices ... could pose a considerable risk”.

The combination of an imploding housing market and a souring of consumer sentiment would deal a heavy blow to the Chinese economy and significantly reduce its appetite for raw materials, particularly iron ore.

In a paper titled “Peak China Housing” published in August 2020, Harvard Professor Kenneth Rogoff and Yuanchen Yang, from Beijing’s Tsinghua University, highlighted how central the real estate and construction sectors are to the Chinese economy, accounting for a staggering 29 per cent of Chinese GDP.

Not surprisingly, they argued that a slowdown in the real estate sector would act as a big brake on Chinese activity.

“We find that a 20 per cent fall in real estate activity could lead to a 5 to 10 per cent fall in GDP, even without amplification from a banking crisis or accounting for the importance of real estate as collateral,” they wrote.

The paper also highlighted the similarity between China’s housing boom with other housing bubbles.

House price surge
“Despite the repeated argument that China is different, we note that it shares striking similarities with other boom episodes in the run-up of housing prices, the scale of the construction sector, the debt accumulation etc.

“Indeed, given the severity of many economic indicators, China’s decades-long housing boom shows many signs of having hit a potentially precarious peak.”

One striking feature of China’s housing boom is the unprecedented surge in house prices.

Prices in China’s Tier 1 cities have risen more than six-fold since 2002, compared with the increase in Ireland of 100 per cent and Spain of 230 per cent in their respective housing booms.

“Currently, the home price to income ratios in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou are comparable to the world’s most expensive cities”, the paper says.

“In particular, the price to income ratios in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen exceed a multiple of 40, compared to 22 in London and 12 in New York.”

The paper notes that these multiples could be justifiable on the assumption that China will continue to enjoy very fast income growth indefinitely.

But, it adds, “even aside from the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s rapidly ageing population, a shrinking technological gap with the West, and normal decreasing returns to investment all suggest that future growth will likely be trending downward.”

The paper also points out that the real estate and construction industries are intertwined in China because property developers basically make their profits by managing the construction process and turning raw land into saleable properties.

“In 2016, real estate and construction industries combined accounted for around 29 per cent of China’s GDP, comparable only by pre-crisis Spain and Ireland,” it says.

That is because although Beijing clearly appreciates there is some undesirable speculation in the housing market, the scale of this speculation is undoubtedly far greater than policymakers realise.

This means the country’s housing market – and the entire economy – is much more vulnerable than Chinese policymakers appreciate.

What’s more, Beijing has had little experience of the abrupt changes in market psychology and the devastating consequences of a collapse in confidence, which means it is probably underestimating the contagion effects of an Evergrande collapse.

Other debt-laden property developers are already feeling the fallout from Evergrande’s problems, as investors and bankers have become wary of lending to the troubled sector.

That means that to survive, highly geared property developers will have little choice but to dump apartments and undeveloped land onto the market, putting intense downward pressure on real estate prices.

Given average Chinese households typically plough their surplus savings into property, a sharp drop in housing prices would quickly cause consumer confidence to plummet.

The Chinese central bank has already taken steps to alleviate liquidity strains, injecting 90 billion yuan ($19.2 billion) into the country’s banking system last week. And Beijing will probably encourage the state-owned banks to step up their lending to other sectors of the economy.

But it is far from clear Beijing will be able to prevent Evergrande’s problems from causing the country’s massive house price bubble to burst.

ou just have to look at the stunning collapse in the iron ore price to realise how nervous investors have become about the outlook for China.

Of course, the ostensible reason for the steep slide in the iron ore price is Beijing’s move to impose production cuts on the country’s steel industry due to environmental concerns.

But Beijing is simultaneously trying to take some heat out of the torrid property market by forcing debt-addicted property developers to deleverage. This, of course, will translate into a slowdown in the country’s property construction industry, and lower demand for steel.

Evergrande – which owes more than $US300 billion ($415 billion) – is the poster child of Beijing’s crackdown on debt-addicted property developers.

And horrified investors are coming to the belated realisation that Beijing has decided to punish excessive risk-taking by allowing Evergrande’s holding company – which owes most of the debt – to collapse.

Chinese policymakers will, of course, be aware of the risks of allowing such a massive corporate collapse, and they will be anxious to avoid a repeat of the 2008 failure of US investment bank Lehman Brothers, which triggered a meltdown in global financial markets.

who told u that CCP got no debt problem ?

The People’s Bank of China reports that the combined domestic debt of corporations, households and the public sector increased last year to a level equivalent to 280 % of GDP (285 trillion yuan or 36 trillion euros), up from 255 % of GDP in 2019. When China’s foreign debt (which the PBoC estimates to be 14.5 % of GDP at the end of June) is included, total debt rises to about 295 % of GDP.

Due to the covid crisis and related measures, the debt-to-GDP ratios of many countries increased significantly last year. Figures from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) for over 40 countries suggest China’s the increase in debt-to-GDP ratio from the start of 2020 to end of June was quite ordinary compared to the other countries. China’s debt-to-GDP ratio, nevertheless, is distinctly higher than in other emerging economies and on par with US and euro area, which have more developed financial markets.

China’s piling on of debt has long raised concerns among observers of the Chinese economy because rapid descents into indebtedness in other countries have typically led to major economic collapse or severe banking crises. Moreover, China was already engaged in efforts to bail out small and medium-sized banks before covid-19 struck, with so at least 500 billion yuan (BOFIT Weekly 40/2020) in public funds already expended. The lion’s share of Chinese debt exists in the form of bank loans taken by the corporate sector. During the covid pandemic, certain branches experienced significant declines in the ability of firms to service their debts. Stress tests released by PBoC in November showed that 10 of 30 banks were would fail even under the mildest stress scenario, which only assumed that GDP growth would be 1.6 % in 2020 and 7.8 % in 2021. The stress tests comprised all of China’s systemically critical banks.

Posted by brightsmart > 51 minutes ago | Report Abuse

in 2019, China has written the official history of China for its 70 anniversary and divided into 3 period.....the mao era, the Deng era and the Xi era. ........mistakes and excess of the Deng era such as corruption, excessive wealth gaps, overly materialistic, will be rectified and corrections made where possible. .....Xi promises a more balanced approach to development with emphasis on environment , clear rivers , green mountains , eradication of extreme poverty , reduction of poverty given priority.

idq...u don't like it? that is your problem , not China's problem.

another silly statement come out from your own imagination. CCP talking is always different from doing. if you travel to China you will see many jobless and abandonned building, youngster looking for job, people cant withraw his own money from bank.

Posted by DickyMe > 48 minutes ago | Report Abuse

As far as Malaysia is concerned, Communism is evil and will be shot dead like stray dogs.
Just talk to the Malay veterans about communists and see the response.
Bukit Kepong incident will be a reminder of communists treachery.
The country had to go under emergency rule more than a decade, due to communists atrocities.

U are right communism is always an evil especially under Xi era.

brightsmart, is a pity man does not want to listen. Taiwan also talk about 1 China ie. ROC. Nixon never mentioned Taiwan is part of the province of China. u may repeat 7/24 here but u cant change the facts. CCP dream of it but CCP forgot that agreement and contract only a historical documents that always emphasized by CCP,

Yes, CCP very successful then dont care about technology banned and economy sanction. all the business including tiktok etc. move out from the US evil market. why care about US toilet paper ....

CCP and Russia evil axis want to stir up the world what to do ?? no problem no worry the evil axis strong enough to conquer the whole world. just let it be if u believe

US going bankcrupcy and US dollar like toilet paper why tiktok still concern about US market ? Just move out and stay away the evil place ... u understand ?

Taiwan also said 1 China ROC.

CCP mouth always peace but action always invasion. what peace u talking about

Posted by brightsmart > 1 minute ago | Report Abuse

Look at this idq....just total lack of respect for the long his history of China and the CPC

U r so silly cant differentiate China history and CCP. China with good cutural and spirits for 5 thousand year old. Chinese wording is beautiful (not sure u know writing Chinese word or culture ?). China invasion is bad & CCP evil axis very bad.

Posted by brandon99 > 44 minutes ago | Report Abuse

Singapore was a part of Malaysia for a few years. Tun M said Singapore is wrong to leave Malaysia. Malaysia can claim Singapore as China claim Taiwan.

U r right. If this logic works then US need to join back Great Britian Empire.

Good to hear that. How many NMs that DNEX making ?

Posted by arztronaut > 3 minutes ago | Report Abuse

CCP moving backwards, nothing to see now

This is very true.

CCP always like to invade other country but ask those victims to be peaceful. Same as Russia both Evil axis.

be the voter and go vote for him.

UN, EU, NATO, AUKUS, Indo-pacific, Five eyes, Asean countries hope for the best and expect the worst. Come on.

I thought CCP already know how to manufacture advance chips why still need to import ?

It is ok to Chips Four make less money, this is to reduce the adance weapon technology. In war, worth it. It seems that u have no knowledge of Advance Chips Stocks in NASDAQ.

The Chinese authorities are committing crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. Abuses committed included mass arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearances, mass surveillance, cultural and religious persecution, separation of families, forced returns to China, forced labor, and sexual violence and violations of reproductive rights. Little news trickled out of Xinjiang in 2021, however, as the authorities maintained tight control over information, and as access to the region, already limited, was further constrained due to Covid-19 movement restrictions.

Some Uyghurs who disappeared into Xinjiang’s abusive “Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism” were confirmed imprisoned, including prominent academic Rahile Dawut, though her alleged crime, length of sentence, and location of imprisonment remained unclear. There were also reports of Uyghurs dying in detention, including biotech researcher Mihriay Erkin, 31, businessman Yaqub Haji, 45, and poet and publisher Haji Mirzahid Kerimi, 82.

A report by the Uyghur Human Rights Project showed the Xinjiang government dispossessed Uyghurs by confiscating $84.8 million worth of assets from 21 jailed Uyghurs and auctioning the assets online.

Beijing and Hong Kong authorities moved aggressively to roll back rights in Hong Kong.

Pro-democracy activists were arbitrarily arrested and detained. In January, authorities arrested 53 politicians for “subversion” for their involvement in a July 2020 public opinion poll. In September, three members of the group Student Politicism were arrested for “conspiracy to incite subversion” for delivering snacks to imprisoned protesters. Ordinary people were arrested for public defiance, such as for displaying flags bearing the banned 2019 protest slogan, “Reclaim Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times.”

At time of writing, over 150 people had been arrested for violating the draconian National Security Law (NSL) since it was imposed on June 30, 2020. Some NSL suspects held in custody were mistreated; pro-democracy activist Tam Tak-chi has been held in solitary confinement since he was detained in September 2020.

Authorities turned Hong Kong’s quasi-democratic institutions into rubber-stamp bodies. In March, Beijing imposed “electoral reforms,” requiring that only those loyal to the Chinese Communist Party could win a seat in Hong Kong’s legislature. In April, following citizens’ calls to cast blank ballots to protest the changes, the government revised the electoral laws to prohibit “incitement of others to cast blank ballots,” with sentences of up to three years in prison. In September, when the government required elected members to the District Council—a consultative body that advises the government on local issues—to take a loyalty oath, about half resigned as they anticipated being disqualified by the government for their pro-democracy views.

With President Xi Jinping at the helm, the Chinese government doubled down on repression inside and outside the country in 2021. Its “zero-tolerance” policy towards Covid-19 strengthened the authorities’ hand, as they imposed harsh policies in the name of public health.

Beijing’s information manipulation has become pervasive: the government censors, punishes dissent, propagates disinformation, and tightens the reins on tech giants. The once-cacophonous internet is now dominated by pro-government voices that report to the authorities on people whose views they deem insufficiently nationalistic.

The Chinese government pushed for more conservative values in 2021, shrinking space for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) and women’s rights—issues previously considered less sensitive. Beijing grew less tolerant of criticism from private entrepreneurs. In July, courts imposed a sentence of 18 years on Sun Dawu, an agricultural tycoon supportive of rights activists, for vague crimes, after handing down a similarly harsh sentence to Ren Zhiqiang, an outspoken real estate mogul.

Xi’s latest promise to tackle inequality and deliver “common prosperity” rings hollow as his government suffocates grassroots voices. After the self-immolation of a delivery truck driver in January, the government tightened regulatory controls to protect gig workers, yet also cracked down on their activism. China’s rapidly expanding inequality led some young people to advocate a form of passive resistance known as “tang ping”—opting out of consumption and demeaning work—a concept that the government condemned and censored.

Authorities devastated human rights protections and civil liberties in Hong Kong, recasting much of the peaceful behavior that had undergirded Hong Kong life, such as publishing news, as acts of subversion. An April 2021 report by Human Rights Watch found authorities were committing crimes against humanity as part of a widespread and systematic attack on Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, including mass detention, torture, and cultural persecution. Tibetans continued to be subjected to grave abuses, including harsh and lengthy imprisonment for exercising their basic rights.

The Chinese government’s rights record and its “wolf warrior” diplomacy resulted in increasingly negative public perceptions of the government in some countries abroad. New research from AidData revealed US$385 billion in “hidden debt” owed by developing countries to Chinese authorities. Some foreign governments took more concrete measures to press the Chinese government to improve its rights record, at home and abroad, but those remained inadequate to effectively challenge the scope and scale of Beijing’s abuses.

It is very obvious the evil axis trying to their force to challenge the world order by invasion UN, EU, NATO, AUKUS, Indo-pacific, Asean countries will defense it.

The Apple supplier had won an order to make AirPods and planned to build a facility in India to manufacture the wireless earphones, two people with direct knowledge of the matter told Reuters last week.

Apple has been shifting production away from China after the country's strict COVID-related restrictions disrupted the manufacturing of new iPhones and other devices in the country. The tech giant is also looking to avoid a hit to its business due to tensions between Beijing and Washington.

The southern Indian state of Karnataka has approved an 80 billion rupee ($967.91 million) investment in the state by a unit of Taiwan's Foxconn .

The investment will lead to the creation of 50,000 jobs, the government said in a statement on Monday.

PM Modi Again Emerges As Most Popular Global Leader With Approval Rating Of 76%.

Prove it with votes and not lip service.

Please differentiate the meaning of invasion and UN interventions appoved by National Security Council including all the FIVE permanent members.

CCP likes Civil war very much and hope other country got Civil war. Civil war make CCP become government. Wherther Taiwan is Civil war just try and see.

Silly fool dont know ancient China keep on invading neighboring countries when they are strong eg. Dynasty Tang, Han, Qing etc.

he list of Chapter VII interventions includes:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 82 (Korea)
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 (Afghanistan)
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
United Nations Operation in Somalia II
United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
United Nations Protection Force (former Yugoslavia)
Oil-for-Food Programme (Iraq)
United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (Gulf War)
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (Libya)
United Nations Security Council Resolution 502 (Argentina)
Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Silly fools also forgot US provide weapon and foods to China to defense Japan invasion.

Silly fool dont know Russia is the worst country invaded China and take away 100 times of Taiwan land size from China. Dont even there was a war between Russia & CCP caused CCP join US alliance and enter UN.

So pity that someone dont know the most numbers of Civil war in human history is China.

Do u know Russia owned by Mongolia before ? When Russia want to return to Mongolia. MH17 shot down by Russia and not Ukraine air force.