Growing companies

Growth is an important component in identifying a company I wish to invest in. Growth can be good and can be bad. Growth can be slow, moderate or fast. Growth can be short term, medium term or long term (how long is the growth runway).

Dividing the companies in the market based on future growth, involves incorporating past performances and predicting future performances. Thus, there is some element of speculation too.

Young companies can grow fast. It is less risky when they are already profitable. Identify these at the times of their rapid growth phase. For many, the growth runway maybe short. Growth soon tapers and slows, when their business matures. In its early rapid growth phase, market tends to confer high PEs for such stocks. When their growths slow, their PEs can contract significantly: be aware of this risk in investing into growth stocks.

In general, I avoid putting new money into companies with no growth or those with erratic growth (non-consistent) or those in decline.

One of the biggest risks for buying stocks priced far below their net asset values is time to monetisation.

Often, companies trade at discounts to their net cash and more broadly, the value of their underlying assets, because of the "time to monetisation" factor.

Towkay A bought a piece of raw land and planted oil palm. He used his savings and also bank loans. The first few years, he continued to plow in more money to plant. FCF was negative. Soon, the plants matured and started providing revenues. However, he continued to put in more money in the plantation as its was still FCF negative. One year, for a brief period, the CPO was enjoying high prices. The plantation revenues were very good for that year, and he was able to declare a dividend to the joy of his shareholders. However, the company continues to have substantial bank loans. Going forward, the revenues continue to grow, its profits likewise, and he was able to slowly reduce the borrowings of his company. However, the shareholders did not get any dividends. Now that his initial project has matured and stabilised, Towkay A acquired a smaller piece of land (about half that of his present plantation) and started clearing the land for replanting. The capex required for the next few years were substantial, and once again the company is in FCF negative, and its bank borrowings increased again. Shareholders can look to a brighter future in later years. For those requiring dividend incomes immediately, this company may not be suitable for them.

TSH has a lot of unplanted land. It sold its plantations for reduce its debts. Going forward, managing its cash flows remains challenging, as future capex is not small.

The fire in Hollywood

With so many homes lost, and such a big area burnt, this fire has changed the lifes of many of its residents. It will be soul changing for some too, reflecting on their properties and possessions, above all their many memories, gone in the fire. Among these residents are some most influential people, and it should be of interest to observe how their lifes are transformed by this event in the future.

The fire is a definite black swan event for the people affected by the fire. In their wildest imagination, few could have foreseen this coming. Yet, interestingly, some insurance companies had stop accepting home insurance coverage for fire: this showed that they were fully aware of the fire risks of this region.

TSH

Look at its assets
Look at its revenues
Look at its profits
Look at its ROE, ROA, ROIC
Look at its FCF
Project its growth
Projects its capex (maintenance and growth capex)
Look at its share price

Then decide.

Don't invest like our Singaporean mad-hatter.

Future was so clear ... NFCP beneficiaries included NETX ... because it supplied to TM before ... and this prediction turned out to be totally wrong and disastrous. 😃

Our Singaporean smart Alec can predict future trends. 😀

Pentamaster International Limited (HK) jumped from HK 0.64 to HK 0.94 on news of privatisation. It was so undervalued before this.

Commodity business
Highly competitive based on price

Year to date
The Group recorded a lower PBT of RM333.811 million for the financial period-to-date as compared to
RM402.579 million in the preceding year corresponding period. The decrease was mainly due to the higher
impairment losses on financing receivables by RM116.420 million and higher other operating expenses of
RM89.392 million in line with increased transaction and financing volume. This is offset by the incremental
increase in revenue of RM214.766 million. The share of losses in AEON Bank for the financial period-to-date
recorded at RM45.511 million. Loan loss coverage ratio stood at 231% as at 30 November 2024 as compared
to 233% as at 30 November 2023.

MYEG

Its income statement for FY 2023 showed Revenue of 774M
Its balance sheet for FY 2023 showed Account Receivable of 700M
This must be worrying. Any explanations?

Year ST Debt LT Debt Total Debt
2019 49M 137M 186M
2023 152M 728M 880M

Though MYEG declared profits from years 2019 to 2023, its debts piled up a lot more (an increase of 694M).
The increasing debt will mean that this company remains in negative FCF.
Why has it incurred so much debt in these years? Where are its new investments into?

MYEG

FY REV NP NPM(%)
2017 372 202 54.2
2018 319 170 53.4
2018 246 -41.4 -16.8
2019 357 175 49
2019 239 130 54.3
2020 532 268 50.4
2021 724 316 43.6
2022 651 399 61.2
2023 774 488 63
2024(3Q) 723 516 71.4

Revenues and Net Profits are in RM millions

PE
Year 2015 to 2020: It was trading at PEs ranging from 40 to 80. In 2018, its PE dropped to around 10; this coincided with BN losing its power in that general election.

Year 2020 to 2024: PE ranged from 10 to 30. This PE has trended downwards during this period and on 18.12.2024, it is trading at PE of 10.77 which is at the lowest point in its PE range.

Why? Is it a risky company going forward? Is it investors think its growth might not be so good going forward? ???

Insiders
CEO Wong Thean Soon has reduced his shareholdings by 67 million shares, and now holds 760.77 million shares.

It pays dividends yearly. The dividends paid in the first half of this decade were higher than those paid in the recent 5 years. Latest dividend declared for FY ending 31.12.2023 was 1.930 sen per share, giving a DY of 2.04% at today's price of 0.945 per share.

PE 10.82
ROE 24.73%
P/B 2.68
NTA 0.353
DPO ratio 28%- 29%

Why is MYEG trading at low PE? Its net profit has increased since 2020. Maybe we should look at its debts and its FCFs?

B. INVESTMENT FOR INCOME, MODERATE LONG-TERM APPRECIATION AND PROTECTION AGAINST INFLATION:
(1) INVESTMENT FUNDS bought at reasonable price.
(2) Diversified list of primary common stocks (BLUE CHIPS) bought at reasonable price.


In my book, F&N falls into category B(2) of Benjamin Graham's Investment Policies.
Buy this company for INCOME, MODERATE LONG-TERM APPRECIATION AND PROTECTION AGAINST INFLATION.
Of course, buy it at a reasonable or bargain price.

F&N

From FY 2015 to 2021, its revenues were flat, at arond 4.1B. The revenue grew subsequently, to 4.5B in FY 22, to 5B in FY 23 and to 5.2B in FY 24.

Its net profits were flat from year 2016 to 2022. It then grew from 383M in FY 22 to 537M in FY 23 and to 543M in FY24.

Net Profit Margins, in the last 5 FY were higher than the previous 5 FY. In particular, the NPM of 2023 was 10.7% and of 2024 was 10.3%; these were values in the upper range.

We can conclude management had done a good job so far.

PE
Its PE ranged from 17 to 48 over the last decade. Usual PE ranged from 17 to 30. It is trading at PE of 18.94 today, which is at its lower PE range, thus, it is not expensive.

F&N has paid dividends regularly. Its DPO is around 53% to 55% of its earnings. It declared 77 sen dividends for the FY ended 30.9.2023, giving a DY of 2.78% based on its price today of 27.74 per share.

Growth
5 Yr CAGR in revenue 5.2%
5 Yr CAGR in profits 5.8%


F&N is a fundamentally strong company. It generates strong FCF.
It is a matured company that is well managed and still growing at about 5% per year in its revenues and profits (matured growth phase in its business life cycle.)

😉

These two groups are distinguished not by the amount of risk they are willing to take, but rather by the amount of "intelligent effort" they are "willing and able to bring to bear on the task."

Types of Investors
Friday, 1 August 2008
Investment Policies (Based on Benjamin Graham)

Graham felt that individual investors fell into two camps : "defensive" investors and "aggressive" or "enterprising" investors.

Friday, 1 August 2008
Investment Policies (Based on Benjamin Graham)

Summary of Investment Policies

A. INVESTMENT FOR FIXED INCOME:
US Savings Bonds (FDs or Amanah Sahams for Malaysians)

B. INVESTMENT FOR INCOME, MODERATE LONG-TERM APPRECIATION AND PROTECTION AGAINST INFLATION:
(1) INVESTMENT FUNDS bought at reasonable price.
(2) Diversified list of primary common stocks (BLUE CHIPS) bought at reasonable price.

C. INVESTMENT CHIEFLY FOR PROFIT: 4 approaches are open to both the small and the large investors:
(1) Representative common stocks bought when the MARKET level is clearly LOW.
(2) GROWTH STOCKS, when these can be obtained at reasonable prices in relation to actual accomplishment – GROWTH INVESTING.
(3) Purchase of securities selling well BELOW INTRINSIC VALUE – VALUE INVESTING.
(4) Purchase of WELL-SECURED PRIVILEGED SENIOR ISSUES (bonds and preferred shares).
(5) SPECIAL SITUATIONS: Mergers, arbitrages, cash pay-outs.

D. SPECULATION:
(1) Buying stock in new or virtually new ventures (IPOs) .
(2) TRADING in the market.
(3) Purchase of "GROWTH STOCKS" at GENEROUS PRICES.


_______________


For DEFENSIVE INVESTORS: Portfolio A & B
(Portfolio A: Cash, FDs, Bonds Portfolio B: Mutual funds, Blue chips)

For ENTERPRISING INVESTORS: Portfolio A & B & C
(Portfolio C: Buy in Low Market, Buy Growth stocks at fair value, Buy value stocks i.e. bargains, High grade bonds and preferred shares, Arbitrages)

For SPECULATORS: Portfolio D
(Should set aside a sum for this separate from their money in investing.)

________________
________________

This blog was started in 1.8.2008.
https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/

This was its first article:
https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2008/08/investment-policies-based-on-benjamin.html

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These are the blogs I used to visit often in the past.
Almost all are no longer active.
Some have been inactive for many years too.

Southern Cable

FY REV NP NPM(%)
2021 660M 10.9M 1.7%
2022 876M 14.5M 1.7%
2023 1.1B 29.4M 2.8%
2024(3Q) 1B 47.1M 4.7%


FY(1ST JAN) PRICE
2021 0.4763
2022 0.3688
2023 0.3175
2024 0.4091
17.12.2024 1.080


Market Capital (RM) 963.36m
Number of Share 892.00m
Revenue (TTM) 1.318B
Net Profit (TTM) 59.50M
Net Margin (TTM) 4.5%
EPS (TTM) 6.67
P/E Ratio 16.19
ROE 15.51%
P/B Ratio 2.51
NTA 0.430

Dividend (cent) 0.750 ^
Dividend Yield 0.69%
Dividend Policy 0%
Dividend Payout 20% 17% 13%
Equity Growth 9% 18% 114%
Net Cash (RM) -91.96M *
Net Cash/Share (RM) 0.00
Free Cash Flow (cent) 28.80M (3.23) *
Debt/Asset Ratio 30% *

* Fundamental data ended 2024-09-30.
^ Total dividend amount declared for financial year ended 2024-12-31.

Pentamaster

FY REV NP NPM(%)

2015 83.6M 12M 14.3%
2016 152M 26.7M 17.6%
2017 284M 35.9M 12.6%
2018 422M 57.1M 13.5%
2019 490M 83M 16.9%
2020 419M 70.9M 16.9%
2021 508M 73.1M 14.4%
2022 601M 82.4M 13.7%
2023 692M 89.1M 12.9%
2024(3Q) 492M 51M 10.4%


Mr. Chuah, the CEO is a remarkable person. He is innovative. In the early years of Penta, however, he tried many innovations which were not exciting and the company lost money.

This company transformed its business. It works in three business segments.
- The Automated equipment segment is engaged in designing, development, and manufacturing of standard and non-standard automated equipment.
- Its Automated manufacturing solution segment is involved in the construction and installation of integrated automated manufacturing solutions.
- The Smart control solution system segment provides project management and smart building solutions.
It operates geographically across countries like Malaysia, China, Japan, Singapore, Republic of Ireland and the United States of America.

It bought a piece of land in Penang and build a new factory. It entered a rapid growth phase in 2015 to 2018/19.
The growth has now slowed and profit margins has been declining in recent years.

Will this company be able to innovate or will it stagnate or will it go on a decline in this competitive sector?

Good call by calvin and raider to sell gloves in this article. Well done.

This thread by calvintaneng, our Singaporean friend, just highlighted how dishonest he and his lieutenant raider were in promoting Netx. They just wanted to excite a herd.

>>>
cheoky

Jesus Christ will punish dato Calvin in afterlife for most crude con job ever done. One promotion of Netx respect for dato drop one more point.

To me Netx is a con counter.

2020-02-08 15:40
>>>

It was obvious to me that Cheoky is smarter and more honest than my Singaporean friend.

Shareholder wealth in a company is destroyed with failure to find new S-curve.

With no growth or business in decline, value of company shrinks (contracting PE x lower EPS).

There are many companies in Bursa Malaysia in this category.

Every business goes through the S-curve cycle of growth: infancy (low growth), expansion (rapid growth) and maturity (slow growth).

No matter how susccessful the product is, growth must slow at some point (maturity phase), due to a number of reasons (increased competition, market saturation, technology disruption, regulatory changes and changing consumer preferences).

Ultimately, wheter a company remains VALUE CREATIVE OR DESTRUSTIVE, depends on how well management understand this inevitability,its mindset and how successful it is in creating new S-curves - developing new engines of growth - ideally before the current cycle of growth reaches maturity.

New S-curves could include tapping into new selling channels and geographies for the existing products, or it could be expansion into a related business - for instance, starting a new product line and going upstream or downstream, or diversification into something entirely different and unrelated.

In short, the S-curve is dynamic over the company's life, that is, the company should continuosly reinvent, reinvest and create new S-curves to start new growth cycles. We see real-life examples of how this is done every day.

New S-curves to start new growth cycles:
QL started Family Mart
YTL Power entered a new S-curve selling power to Singapore and enters the AI related sector.
Padini started Brands' Outlets.
Facebook promoting metaverse (but unsuccessfully).
Microsoft branching into cloud computing and AI.
Amazon continues to reinvent itself, selling books initially, and now selling almost everything. (Many new S-curves)
Scientex growing its manufacturing business organically and through acquistions and entering the property development sector business successfully.
KGB supplying its products to many industries and to many countries.

Of course, growth comes with a price too. Some growths are good and some can be very bad for the companies.

Every business goes through the S-curve cycle of growth: infancy (low growth), expansion (rapid growth) and maturity (slow growth).

Different businesses have a different S-curve shape and longevity.

Some S-curves will be steeper (stronger rates of growth) than others due to major innovation (e.g. Nvidia) that drives rapid adoption and demand across multiple market segments (market size).

Some S-curves will have greater longevity, that is, sustained high growth (expansion phase) for a longer period of time (e.g Amazon, Apple, Facebook) for a longer period of time because of, intellectual property protection or strong network effects. These have enduring competitive advantage.

Companies that have steeper S-curve with longevity will also trade at higher valuations.

Savvy investors know about the corporate life cycle: start-up, rapid growth phase, mature growth phase, stagnation or outright decline.

Companies in their startup phase lose money.
If they're successful, though, they enter a rapid growth period, where sales - and eventually profits - shoot upward.
Then, alas, comes the point when the company has exhausted all of the easy growth opportunities. The low-hanging fruit has been picked. The company enters a mature phase in which sales maybe growing, but at a much slower rate than before.
Finally, in a company's dotage, it's all management can do to grow the company at all. The company's either in stagnation or outright decline.

Best time to invest is during its explosive growth phase or the mature slower growth phase of a successful company. Emphasis: growth phase.

https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/search?q=life+cycle+of+successful+growth+company

Padini grew its concepts stores in the years before 2010. Its business grew at a fast rate. It cleverly rolled out its Brand's Outlets in a big way in 2010, and this sustained the growth for another 5 years or so. The fast growth phase of Padini is now in the past.

We can expect a low- to mid-single-digit revenue growth in the coming years, driven by targeted marketing, store optimization, and expansion of affordable product ranges​.

Padini remains a defensive stock with potential for stable dividend payouts due to its strong cash position​

PADINI

2014 11.5 SEN
2015 10 SEN
2016 11.5 SEN
2017 11.5 SEN
2018 11.5 SEN
2019 11.5 SEN
2020 7.5 SEN
2021 2.5 SEN
2022 10 SEN
2023 11.5 SEN
2024 11.5 SEN
2025 5 SEN (INTERIM)


Dividend (cent) 11.500 ^
Dividend Yield 3.52%
Dividend Policy 0%
Dividend Payout 52% 43% 45%
Equity Growth 7% 39% 50%
Net Cash (RM) 276.18M (13%) *
Net Cash/Share (RM) 0.42 *
Free Cash Flow (cent) 338.35M (51.43) *
Debt/Asset Ratio 29% *
* Fundamental data ended 2024-09-30.
^ Total dividend amount declared for financial year ended 2024-06-30.

Market Capital (RM) 2.151b
Number of Share 657.91m
Revenue (TTM) 1.924B
Net Profit (TTM) 131.45M
Net Margin (TTM) 6.8%
EPS (TTM) 19.98
P/E Ratio 16.37
ROE 11.89%
P/B Ratio 1.95
NTA 1.680

PADINI

FY (JAN) PRICE
2015 0.43
2016 0.98
2017 1.775
2018 4.70
2019 3.065
2020 2.840
2021 2.475
2022 2.495
2023 3.140
2024 3.485

16.12.2025 3.270

Padini

FY REV NP NPM(%)
2016 1.3B 137M 10.6%
2017 1.6B 157M 10%
2018 1.7B 178M 10.6%
2019 1.8B 160M 9%
2020 1.4B 75.2M 5.5%
2021 1B 54M 5.3%
2022 1.3B 154M 11.7%
2023 1.8B 22.2M 12.2%
2024 1.9B 147M 7.6%
2025 (1Q) 393M 11.5M 2.9%

Many in this forum may make money recurrently and intermittently. But their wealth grow in an arithmetic progression.

Only a few in this forum, from my observation, are compounding their money over a long time horizon. Compounding is growth akin to geometric progression.


Benjamin Graham, the father of value iinvesting invested for a lifetime buying undervalued stocks and selling them when they reached or approached his intrinsic values for these stocks. He bought and sold many, perhaps, hundreds or thousands of these stocks in this manner. Yet, at the time of his death, retrospectively, most of his wealth was derived from investing into Geico which he held on for a very long time. Through compounding in Geico, the gains in Geico overwhelmed all the gains of all his other transactions aggregated together. That is the power of compounding, growing in geometric progression, rather than in arithmetic progression.

https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2024/12/bacteria-and-bricklayers.html
Do you wish to grow like a bricklayer or grow like a bacteria?

Companies that report consistent profits but also a substantial rise in gearing; this would indicate they have negative FCF.

The present market price of Hartalega has priced in future margin expansion. Its margins have been hit post-pandemic but should expand going forward. Likewise, for other glove manufacturers in Malaysia too.

Further lessons:
1. Always buy low, and never buy high.
2. You may sell when it is obviously overpriced. Sell all or some or none!
Those who have owned Hartalega for many years, and who have not bought during the pandemic did not suffer any losses to-date and are still sitting on huge long term gains. Long term investors do sleep soundly most of the time.

Lessons
1. A great company can be a very bad investment when you pay too much to own it.
2. Smart investors move first, followed by the big investors and then the dumb investors.
3. In many bubbles, the price climbed gradually and price dropped steeply. During the pandemic, the price chart of Hartalega was interesting. The peak price was reached in July 2020 (7 months climb) and soon after, the price declined gradually to reach its lowest price in Feb 2023 (1 year 7 months).
4. Know valuation using DCF. Non-sustainable spikes in earnings or cash flows should not be enthusiastically used in your valuation. Normalised these earnings or cash flows in doing your simplified DCF. A good way is to congratulate yourself that the company has done well for this year or that year, and you can expect a special dividend from this good fortune, which is not sustainable long term.

Hartalega

FY ... REV ... NP ... NPM(%)
2016 1.5B 258M 17.2%
2017 1.8B 283M 15.5%
2018 2.4B 439M 18.3%
2019 2.8B 456M 16.1%
2020 2.9B 435M 14.9%
2021 6.7B 2.9B 43.1%
2022 7.9B 3.2B 41%
2023 2.4B -218M -9.1%
2024 1.8B 12.7M 0.7%
2025(2Q) 1.2B 40.6M 3.3%

The pandemic of 2020 to 2021 were 2 exceptional years for glove manufacturers.
Hartalega's revenue doubled from 2.9B (FY 2020) to 6.7B (FY 2021) and 7.9B (FY 2022).
Its Net Profit Margin expanded from 14.9% (FY 2020) to 43.1% (FY 2021) and 41% (FY 2022),
Its Net Profit increased from 435M (FY 2020) to 2.9B (FY 2021) and 3.2B (FY 2022).

Date Price (RM) adj
Aug 2018 7.1443 New all time high price
Mar 2019 4.5233
Dec 2019 5.2290
July 2020 20.3502 Highest price during the pandemic
Sep 2022 1.7007
Feb 2023 1.4487 Lowest price reached
13.12.24 3.88

Its per share price jumped from around RM5 at end of 2009 to its highest of RM 20.35 in July 2020.
From July 2020 to Sep 2022, the per share price declined gradually and continuously, with occasional non-sustainable spikes.
For FY 2021 and FY 2022, it distributed total dividends of RM 1.08 sen per share.


Did you own Hartalega, before, during and after the pandemic?
Did you make or lose money in this counter to-date?
What lessons can be learned from this period?
Were there more winners or losers coming out of this Feb 2023 when Hartalega was at its lowest price of RM 1.4487?
Do you have a strategy when faced with something that rhyme like this period in the future?

"History does not repeat exactly, but it rhymes."

Hartalega

Dividends distributed for
FY 2021 50.95 sen per share
FY 2022 57 sen per share

HARTALEGA

Date Price (RM) adj
Aug 2018 7.1443 New all time high price
Mar 2019 4.5233
Dec 2019 5.2290
July 2020 20.3502 Highest price during the pandemic
Sep 2022 1.7007
Feb 2023 1.4487
13.12.24 3.88

From July 2020 to Sep 2022, the share price declined gradually over this period, with occasional non-sustainable spikes.

Hartalega

# 1st Jan of FY
FY ... #ADJ PRICE (RM) @@@ REV ... NP ... NPM

2009 0.0965
2010 0.4016
2011 0.4761
2012 0.6393
2013 0.8177
2014 1.3279
2015 1.45
2016 2.0961 @@@ 1.5B 258M 17.2%
2017 1.8649 @@@ 1.8B 283M 15.5%
2018 4.7320 @@@ 2.4B 439M 18.3%
2019 4.3896 @@@ 2.8B 456M 16.1%
2020 4.8855 @@@ 2.9B 435M 14.9%
2021 10.7033 @@@ 6.7B 2.9B 43.1%
2022 5.5205 @@@ 7.9B 3.2B 41%
2023 1.6056 @@@ 2.4B -218M -9.1%
2024 2.7325 @@@ 1.8B 12.7M 0.7%
2025(2Q) --- @@@ 1.2B 40.6M 3.3%

13.12.2024 3.88 Dividend 0.1141 DY 0.14%

For those looking for high growth companies, look at small to medium cap companies. This is where to fish for the fast growers.

AEON CREDIT

Once again, earnings growth was high in the earlier years. Earnings growth slowed since 2019 and has been range bound.

Its share prices reflected this too.

Those who have invested early into this company from its early years and holding the stocks up to today, would have captured its fast growth phase and be rewarded handsomely.

Aeon Credit

FY .. REV .. NP .. NPM(%)
2016 965M 228M 23.6%
2017 1.1B 265M 24.1%
2018 1.2B 300M 24.3%
2019 1.4B 355M 26%
2020 1.6B 292M 18.3%
2021 1.6B 234M 15%
2022 1.5B 365M 24%
2023 1.6B 418M 25.5%
2024 1.9B 424M 22.2%
2025 1.1B 178M 16.7% (2Q)

Aeon Credit

Share price (RM)
1st Jan

2008 0.46
2009 0.41
2010 0.63
2011 0.65
2012 1.22
2013 2.30
2014 2.95
2015 2.93
2016 2.69
2017 3.99
2018 5.34
2019 6.51
2020 5.44
2021 4.65
2022 6.55
2023 5.82
2024 5.67
13.12.2024 6.25 Dividend 0.28

Aeon Credit

Share price (RM)
1st Jan

2008 0.46
2009 0.41
2010 0.63
2011 0.65
2012 1.22
2013 2.30
2014 2.95
2015 2.93
2016 2.69
2017 3.99
2018 5.34
2019 6.51
2020 5.44
2021 4.65
2022 6.55
2023 5.82
2024 5.67
13.12.2024 6.25 Dividend 0.28

In 2018, TDM was held high by those who voted his party in. He was a great disappointment in his 2nd term as PM.

Most analysts talk about profits, not cash flows.
Profits, as presented based on accounting standards, may not reflect the actual underlying cash flows.

The most popular valuation metrics are Price/Earnings, Price/Ebidta, Price/Sales, Price/Book value and EV/Ebitda.
(EV or Enterprise Value = Market cap + Debt)

Many different methods as listed above are used to arrive at the valuation for stocks.

However, remember that there is ever only one definition for valuation: the discounted cash flow.

All the above metrics are merely short forms or shortcuts for discounted cash flow. These metrics are widely used because they are easier to compute and understand, and can be compared across companies, sectors and markets. Critically, while these shortcut metrics are useful, they are insufficient and sometimes, can be misused to present a false picture.