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INTRODUCTION

The Board of Malaysia Building Society Berhad is pleased to announce that its wholly-owned subsidiary, MBSB Bank Berhad (“MBSB Bank” or the “Issuer”), is establishing a sukuk programme of up to RM10.0 billion in nominal value (“Sukuk Wakalah Programme”) under the Shariah principle of Wakalah Bi Al-Istithmar for the issuance of Senior sukuk wakalah (“Senior Sukuk Wakalah”) and/or Tier-2 sukuk wakalah (“Tier-2 Sukuk Wakalah”) and/or Additional Tier-1 capital sukuk wakalah (“AT-1 Sukuk Wakalah”) (collectively, “Sukuk Wakalah”).

The proposed Sukuk Wakalah Programme was lodged with the Securities Commission Malaysia (“SC”) on 20 November 2019 in accordance with the SC’s Guidelines on Unlisted Capital Market Products under the Lodge and Launch Framework (effective 15 June 2015).

DETAILS OF THE SUKUK WAKALAH PROGRAMME

The Sukuk Wakalah Programme has been structured to provide the Issuer with the flexibility to issue, from time to time, Senior Sukuk Wakalah and/or Tier-2 Sukuk Wakalah and/or AT-1 Sukuk Wakalah under the Shariah principle of Wakalah Bi Al-Istithmar.

The proceeds from the issuance of the Sukuk Wakalah shall be utilised by MBSB Bank for its Shariah-compliant general banking purposes and to refinance its outstanding capital instruments.

The issuance of Senior Sukuk Wakalah provides the Issuer with senior funding for its general banking purposes whilst the Tier-2 Sukuk Wakalah and AT-1 Sukuk Wakalah are structured to comply with Bank Negara Malaysia’s Capital Adequacy Framework for Islamic Banks (Capital Components) issued on 2 February 2018 (“CAFIB”) in relation to the requirements of a Tier-2 capital instrument and an Additional Tier-1 capital instrument, respectively.

The Tier-2 Sukuk Wakalah are intended to qualify as Tier-2 regulatory capital and the AT-1 Sukuk Wakalah as Additional Tier-1 regulatory capital of the Issuer.

This Announcement is dated 20 November 2019.

EPS YTD 5.58 vs 8.58. Good?

2 sen?

Buying momentum detected..

Failure Promoter..ermm

Limit Up or Down?

PBT 534m (6months 2018) vs 254m (6months2019).. 90sen or 80sen this week?

Ytd Jun19 vs Ytd Jun18 decrease 100%

OTHERS Quarterly Financial Report pursuant to Paragraph 9.22 of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.

MALAYSIA BUILDING SOCIETY BERHAD

Type Announcement
Subject OTHERS
Description Quarterly Financial Report pursuant to Paragraph 9.22 of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.
Reference is made to the announcement dated 14 August 2019.


We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has changed the date to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 to Friday, 30 August 2019.


This announcement is dated 27 August 2019.


Announcement Info
Company Name MALAYSIA BUILDING SOCIETY BERHAD
Stock Name MBSB
Date Announced 27 Aug 2019
Category General Announcement for PLC
Reference Number GA1-26082019-00005

Tell me why

CMY not a director..No power to approve any proposal of the management(Board Meeting)..better CMY buy some shares from small company (sumatec, eah, puc)

If If If..too many If

Reference is made to the announcements dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has changed the date to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 to Wednesday, 28 August 2019.

This announcement is dated 14 August 2019.

Reference is made to the announcements dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has changed the date to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 to Wednesday, 28 August 2019.

This announcement is dated 14 August 2019.

Reference is made to the announcements dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has changed the date to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 to Wednesday, 28 August 2019.

This announcement is dated 14 August 2019.

Reference is made to the announcements dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has changed the date to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 to Wednesday, 28 August 2019.

This announcement is dated 14 August 2019.

Reference is made to the announcements dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has changed the date to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 to Wednesday, 28 August 2019.

This announcement is dated 14 August 2019.

Reference is made to the announcements dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has changed the date to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 to Wednesday, 28 August 2019.

This announcement is dated 14 August 2019.

Reference is made to the announcements dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has changed the date to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 to Wednesday, 28 August 2019.

This announcement is dated 14 August 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has scheduled to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 on Thursday, 15 August 2019 in accordance with Paragraph 9.22 of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.

This announcement is dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has scheduled to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 on Thursday, 15 August 2019 in accordance with Paragraph 9.22 of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.

This announcement is dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has scheduled to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 on Thursday, 15 August 2019 in accordance with Paragraph 9.22 of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.

This announcement is dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has scheduled to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 on Thursday, 15 August 2019 in accordance with Paragraph 9.22 of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.

This announcement is dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has scheduled to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 on Thursday, 15 August 2019 in accordance with Paragraph 9.22 of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.

This announcement is dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has scheduled to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 on Thursday, 15 August 2019 in accordance with Paragraph 9.22 of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.

This announcement is dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has scheduled to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 on Thursday, 15 August 2019 in accordance with Paragraph 9.22 of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.

This announcement is dated 31 July 2019.

We wish to inform that Malaysia Building Society Berhad ("MBSB") has scheduled to release its' financial results for the second quarter ended 30 June 2019 on Thursday, 15 August 2019 in accordance with Paragraph 9.22 of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.

This announcement is dated 31 July 2019.

Buy today? Sell tomorrow?

Critically, as Jim Grant noted recently, the spread between the 10-year and three-month yields is an important indicator, James Bianco, president and eponym of Bianco Research LLC notes today. On six occasions over the past 50 years when the three-month yield exceeded that of the 10-year, economic recession invariably followed, commencing an average of 311 days after the initial signal.

Finally, Joseph Carson, former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein, notes that recessions are far from being alike and their symptoms and causes differ over time. Despite its many shapes and sizes the historical regularity that an inverted Treasury yield curve has coincided with recession has raised concern now that yields on longer-dated Treasuries have fallen been below shorter-term yields for several months running.

The power of the term spread to predict or anticipate economic recessions needs to be respected, but there are several new domestic and global factors that are present today, suggesting that the signaling effect from changes in the Treasury yield curve directly to the economy's future performance might not be as robust as it was past periods.

First, this is the first economic cycle that involved a bond-buying program by the Federal Reserve. The quantitative bond-buying program produced a technical anchoring effect at the long-end of the bond market that was not present in prior cycles. While this program did not cause a yield curve inversion by itself it did result in a flatter yield curve than what otherwise would have been the case, and as a result, it would not take much force from other factors to trigger an inversion in the term spread of yields.

Second, given the increased globalization of the financial markets the appeal and demand of long-dated US Treasury securities is often based on the yields available in other major economies. Long bond yields in a number of major economies (such Germany, Japan and France) are negative and many others (including the UK, Spain and Australia) are below 1% and that has led to an increase in global demand for long-dated US Treasury securities since yields in the US are in some cases 100 to 200 basis points over the yields of comparable maturities in other economies. That increased global demand for US securities is a new technical factor and unrelated to the performance of the US economy.

Third, this is the first time the inversion of the Treasury curve occurred with nominal yields at the short and long end that were well below the growth in nominal income and GDP (or the economy's yield curve). Why is that important? There is a direct negative consequence to the economy's performance when the cost of borrowing exceeds the growth in nominal income. At that point, the cost of new borrowing starts to become too costly, leading to a slowdown or a decline in credit use, and a weaker economy.

Although it is often overlooked, all of the Treasury yield curve inversions that have preceded recessions have coincided with an inversion in the economy's yield curve, or when short and long-term nominal rates were above the growth in nominal income and GDP. The fact that the Treasury yield curve has inverted at relatively low nominal yields, suggests that the interest rate channel is not producing the restrictive influences on the economy as it did during prior inversions and instead is actually providing a cushion (or stimulus) to the economy. Policymakers should take note of this unusual occurrence and not rush to ease policy further, saving its interest rate powder for another time.

If the Treasury curve inversion is not producing a restrictive influence on the economy as it did in the past can the US still experience a recession? Yes, but it would come from different channels.

The biggest recession risk today centers around the trade dispute between the US and China. Trade disputes have the potential to be very disruptive and contractionary and can operate through a number of channels, such as trade volumes and production, currencies and prices and asset markets.

Of all of these channels, the biggest vulnerability for the US is the equity channel since the market value of equities relative to income and GDP is at record highs, providing consumers with vast sums of liquidity and wealth. If the imposition of new tariffs and the uncertainty over what may follow triggers a de-risking and rush to exit, sparking a sustained 25% to 30% correction in the equity market that by itself could trigger a recession as it would deal a substantial blow to consumer liquidity and wealth, and an abrupt and sharp decline in spending and confidence.

That is not a forecast or a prediction but merely an observation that all recessions have been caused by some form of a demand shock, and the inverted yield curve merely highlighted the vulnerability of the economy to a potential bad outcome.

Critically, as Jim Grant noted recently, the spread between the 10-year and three-month yields is an important indicator, James Bianco, president and eponym of Bianco Research LLC notes today. On six occasions over the past 50 years when the three-month yield exceeded that of the 10-year, economic recession invariably followed, commencing an average of 311 days after the initial signal.

Finally, Joseph Carson, former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein, notes that recessions are far from being alike and their symptoms and causes differ over time. Despite its many shapes and sizes the historical regularity that an inverted Treasury yield curve has coincided with recession has raised concern now that yields on longer-dated Treasuries have fallen been below shorter-term yields for several months running.

The power of the term spread to predict or anticipate economic recessions needs to be respected, but there are several new domestic and global factors that are present today, suggesting that the signaling effect from changes in the Treasury yield curve directly to the economy's future performance might not be as robust as it was past periods.

First, this is the first economic cycle that involved a bond-buying program by the Federal Reserve. The quantitative bond-buying program produced a technical anchoring effect at the long-end of the bond market that was not present in prior cycles. While this program did not cause a yield curve inversion by itself it did result in a flatter yield curve than what otherwise would have been the case, and as a result, it would not take much force from other factors to trigger an inversion in the term spread of yields.

Second, given the increased globalization of the financial markets the appeal and demand of long-dated US Treasury securities is often based on the yields available in other major economies. Long bond yields in a number of major economies (such Germany, Japan and France) are negative and many others (including the UK, Spain and Australia) are below 1% and that has led to an increase in global demand for long-dated US Treasury securities since yields in the US are in some cases 100 to 200 basis points over the yields of comparable maturities in other economies. That increased global demand for US securities is a new technical factor and unrelated to the performance of the US economy.

Third, this is the first time the inversion of the Treasury curve occurred with nominal yields at the short and long end that were well below the growth in nominal income and GDP (or the economy's yield curve). Why is that important? There is a direct negative consequence to the economy's performance when the cost of borrowing exceeds the growth in nominal income. At that point, the cost of new borrowing starts to become too costly, leading to a slowdown or a decline in credit use, and a weaker economy.

Although it is often overlooked, all of the Treasury yield curve inversions that have preceded recessions have coincided with an inversion in the economy's yield curve, or when short and long-term nominal rates were above the growth in nominal income and GDP. The fact that the Treasury yield curve has inverted at relatively low nominal yields, suggests that the interest rate channel is not producing the restrictive influences on the economy as it did during prior inversions and instead is actually providing a cushion (or stimulus) to the economy. Policymakers should take note of this unusual occurrence and not rush to ease policy further, saving its interest rate powder for another time.

If the Treasury curve inversion is not producing a restrictive influence on the economy as it did in the past can the US still experience a recession? Yes, but it would come from different channels.

The biggest recession risk today centers around the trade dispute between the US and China. Trade disputes have the potential to be very disruptive and contractionary and can operate through a number of channels, such as trade volumes and production, currencies and prices and asset markets.

Of all of these channels, the biggest vulnerability for the US is the equity channel since the market value of equities relative to income and GDP is at record highs, providing consumers with vast sums of liquidity and wealth. If the imposition of new tariffs and the uncertainty over what may follow triggers a de-risking and rush to exit, sparking a sustained 25% to 30% correction in the equity market that by itself could trigger a recession as it would deal a substantial blow to consumer liquidity and wealth, and an abrupt and sharp decline in spending and confidence.

That is not a forecast or a prediction but merely an observation that all recessions have been caused by some form of a demand shock, and the inverted yield curve merely highlighted the vulnerability of the economy to a potential bad outcome.

Critically, as Jim Grant noted recently, the spread between the 10-year and three-month yields is an important indicator, James Bianco, president and eponym of Bianco Research LLC notes today. On six occasions over the past 50 years when the three-month yield exceeded that of the 10-year, economic recession invariably followed, commencing an average of 311 days after the initial signal.

Finally, Joseph Carson, former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein, notes that recessions are far from being alike and their symptoms and causes differ over time. Despite its many shapes and sizes the historical regularity that an inverted Treasury yield curve has coincided with recession has raised concern now that yields on longer-dated Treasuries have fallen been below shorter-term yields for several months running.

The power of the term spread to predict or anticipate economic recessions needs to be respected, but there are several new domestic and global factors that are present today, suggesting that the signaling effect from changes in the Treasury yield curve directly to the economy's future performance might not be as robust as it was past periods.

First, this is the first economic cycle that involved a bond-buying program by the Federal Reserve. The quantitative bond-buying program produced a technical anchoring effect at the long-end of the bond market that was not present in prior cycles. While this program did not cause a yield curve inversion by itself it did result in a flatter yield curve than what otherwise would have been the case, and as a result, it would not take much force from other factors to trigger an inversion in the term spread of yields.

Second, given the increased globalization of the financial markets the appeal and demand of long-dated US Treasury securities is often based on the yields available in other major economies. Long bond yields in a number of major economies (such Germany, Japan and France) are negative and many others (including the UK, Spain and Australia) are below 1% and that has led to an increase in global demand for long-dated US Treasury securities since yields in the US are in some cases 100 to 200 basis points over the yields of comparable maturities in other economies. That increased global demand for US securities is a new technical factor and unrelated to the performance of the US economy.

Third, this is the first time the inversion of the Treasury curve occurred with nominal yields at the short and long end that were well below the growth in nominal income and GDP (or the economy's yield curve). Why is that important? There is a direct negative consequence to the economy's performance when the cost of borrowing exceeds the growth in nominal income. At that point, the cost of new borrowing starts to become too costly, leading to a slowdown or a decline in credit use, and a weaker economy.

Although it is often overlooked, all of the Treasury yield curve inversions that have preceded recessions have coincided with an inversion in the economy's yield curve, or when short and long-term nominal rates were above the growth in nominal income and GDP. The fact that the Treasury yield curve has inverted at relatively low nominal yields, suggests that the interest rate channel is not producing the restrictive influences on the economy as it did during prior inversions and instead is actually providing a cushion (or stimulus) to the economy. Policymakers should take note of this unusual occurrence and not rush to ease policy further, saving its interest rate powder for another time.

If the Treasury curve inversion is not producing a restrictive influence on the economy as it did in the past can the US still experience a recession? Yes, but it would come from different channels.

The biggest recession risk today centers around the trade dispute between the US and China. Trade disputes have the potential to be very disruptive and contractionary and can operate through a number of channels, such as trade volumes and production, currencies and prices and asset markets.

Of all of these channels, the biggest vulnerability for the US is the equity channel since the market value of equities relative to income and GDP is at record highs, providing consumers with vast sums of liquidity and wealth. If the imposition of new tariffs and the uncertainty over what may follow triggers a de-risking and rush to exit, sparking a sustained 25% to 30% correction in the equity market that by itself could trigger a recession as it would deal a substantial blow to consumer liquidity and wealth, and an abrupt and sharp decline in spending and confidence.

That is not a forecast or a prediction but merely an observation that all recessions have been caused by some form of a demand shock, and the inverted yield curve merely highlighted the vulnerability of the economy to a potential bad outcome.

Critically, as Jim Grant noted recently, the spread between the 10-year and three-month yields is an important indicator, James Bianco, president and eponym of Bianco Research LLC notes today. On six occasions over the past 50 years when the three-month yield exceeded that of the 10-year, economic recession invariably followed, commencing an average of 311 days after the initial signal.

Finally, Joseph Carson, former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein, notes that recessions are far from being alike and their symptoms and causes differ over time. Despite its many shapes and sizes the historical regularity that an inverted Treasury yield curve has coincided with recession has raised concern now that yields on longer-dated Treasuries have fallen been below shorter-term yields for several months running.

The power of the term spread to predict or anticipate economic recessions needs to be respected, but there are several new domestic and global factors that are present today, suggesting that the signaling effect from changes in the Treasury yield curve directly to the economy's future performance might not be as robust as it was past periods.

First, this is the first economic cycle that involved a bond-buying program by the Federal Reserve. The quantitative bond-buying program produced a technical anchoring effect at the long-end of the bond market that was not present in prior cycles. While this program did not cause a yield curve inversion by itself it did result in a flatter yield curve than what otherwise would have been the case, and as a result, it would not take much force from other factors to trigger an inversion in the term spread of yields.

Second, given the increased globalization of the financial markets the appeal and demand of long-dated US Treasury securities is often based on the yields available in other major economies. Long bond yields in a number of major economies (such Germany, Japan and France) are negative and many others (including the UK, Spain and Australia) are below 1% and that has led to an increase in global demand for long-dated US Treasury securities since yields in the US are in some cases 100 to 200 basis points over the yields of comparable maturities in other economies. That increased global demand for US securities is a new technical factor and unrelated to the performance of the US economy.

Third, this is the first time the inversion of the Treasury curve occurred with nominal yields at the short and long end that were well below the growth in nominal income and GDP (or the economy's yield curve). Why is that important? There is a direct negative consequence to the economy's performance when the cost of borrowing exceeds the growth in nominal income. At that point, the cost of new borrowing starts to become too costly, leading to a slowdown or a decline in credit use, and a weaker economy.

Although it is often overlooked, all of the Treasury yield curve inversions that have preceded recessions have coincided with an inversion in the economy's yield curve, or when short and long-term nominal rates were above the growth in nominal income and GDP. The fact that the Treasury yield curve has inverted at relatively low nominal yields, suggests that the interest rate channel is not producing the restrictive influences on the economy as it did during prior inversions and instead is actually providing a cushion (or stimulus) to the economy. Policymakers should take note of this unusual occurrence and not rush to ease policy further, saving its interest rate powder for another time.

If the Treasury curve inversion is not producing a restrictive influence on the economy as it did in the past can the US still experience a recession? Yes, but it would come from different channels.

The biggest recession risk today centers around the trade dispute between the US and China. Trade disputes have the potential to be very disruptive and contractionary and can operate through a number of channels, such as trade volumes and production, currencies and prices and asset markets.

Of all of these channels, the biggest vulnerability for the US is the equity channel since the market value of equities relative to income and GDP is at record highs, providing consumers with vast sums of liquidity and wealth. If the imposition of new tariffs and the uncertainty over what may follow triggers a de-risking and rush to exit, sparking a sustained 25% to 30% correction in the equity market that by itself could trigger a recession as it would deal a substantial blow to consumer liquidity and wealth, and an abrupt and sharp decline in spending and confidence.

That is not a forecast or a prediction but merely an observation that all recessions have been caused by some form of a demand shock, and the inverted yield curve merely highlighted the vulnerability of the economy to a potential bad outcome.

Critically, as Jim Grant noted recently, the spread between the 10-year and three-month yields is an important indicator, James Bianco, president and eponym of Bianco Research LLC notes today. On six occasions over the past 50 years when the three-month yield exceeded that of the 10-year, economic recession invariably followed, commencing an average of 311 days after the initial signal.

Finally, Joseph Carson, former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein, notes that recessions are far from being alike and their symptoms and causes differ over time. Despite its many shapes and sizes the historical regularity that an inverted Treasury yield curve has coincided with recession has raised concern now that yields on longer-dated Treasuries have fallen been below shorter-term yields for several months running.

The power of the term spread to predict or anticipate economic recessions needs to be respected, but there are several new domestic and global factors that are present today, suggesting that the signaling effect from changes in the Treasury yield curve directly to the economy's future performance might not be as robust as it was past periods.

First, this is the first economic cycle that involved a bond-buying program by the Federal Reserve. The quantitative bond-buying program produced a technical anchoring effect at the long-end of the bond market that was not present in prior cycles. While this program did not cause a yield curve inversion by itself it did result in a flatter yield curve than what otherwise would have been the case, and as a result, it would not take much force from other factors to trigger an inversion in the term spread of yields.

Second, given the increased globalization of the financial markets the appeal and demand of long-dated US Treasury securities is often based on the yields available in other major economies. Long bond yields in a number of major economies (such Germany, Japan and France) are negative and many others (including the UK, Spain and Australia) are below 1% and that has led to an increase in global demand for long-dated US Treasury securities since yields in the US are in some cases 100 to 200 basis points over the yields of comparable maturities in other economies. That increased global demand for US securities is a new technical factor and unrelated to the performance of the US economy.

Third, this is the first time the inversion of the Treasury curve occurred with nominal yields at the short and long end that were well below the growth in nominal income and GDP (or the economy's yield curve). Why is that important? There is a direct negative consequence to the economy's performance when the cost of borrowing exceeds the growth in nominal income. At that point, the cost of new borrowing starts to become too costly, leading to a slowdown or a decline in credit use, and a weaker economy.

Although it is often overlooked, all of the Treasury yield curve inversions that have preceded recessions have coincided with an inversion in the economy's yield curve, or when short and long-term nominal rates were above the growth in nominal income and GDP. The fact that the Treasury yield curve has inverted at relatively low nominal yields, suggests that the interest rate channel is not producing the restrictive influences on the economy as it did during prior inversions and instead is actually providing a cushion (or stimulus) to the economy. Policymakers should take note of this unusual occurrence and not rush to ease policy further, saving its interest rate powder for another time.

If the Treasury curve inversion is not producing a restrictive influence on the economy as it did in the past can the US still experience a recession? Yes, but it would come from different channels.

The biggest recession risk today centers around the trade dispute between the US and China. Trade disputes have the potential to be very disruptive and contractionary and can operate through a number of channels, such as trade volumes and production, currencies and prices and asset markets.

Of all of these channels, the biggest vulnerability for the US is the equity channel since the market value of equities relative to income and GDP is at record highs, providing consumers with vast sums of liquidity and wealth. If the imposition of new tariffs and the uncertainty over what may follow triggers a de-risking and rush to exit, sparking a sustained 25% to 30% correction in the equity market that by itself could trigger a recession as it would deal a substantial blow to consumer liquidity and wealth, and an abrupt and sharp decline in spending and confidence.

That is not a forecast or a prediction but merely an observation that all recessions have been caused by some form of a demand shock, and the inverted yield curve merely highlighted the vulnerability of the economy to a potential bad outcome.

Critically, as Jim Grant noted recently, the spread between the 10-year and three-month yields is an important indicator, James Bianco, president and eponym of Bianco Research LLC notes today. On six occasions over the past 50 years when the three-month yield exceeded that of the 10-year, economic recession invariably followed, commencing an average of 311 days after the initial signal.

Finally, Joseph Carson, former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein, notes that recessions are far from being alike and their symptoms and causes differ over time. Despite its many shapes and sizes the historical regularity that an inverted Treasury yield curve has coincided with recession has raised concern now that yields on longer-dated Treasuries have fallen been below shorter-term yields for several months running.

The power of the term spread to predict or anticipate economic recessions needs to be respected, but there are several new domestic and global factors that are present today, suggesting that the signaling effect from changes in the Treasury yield curve directly to the economy's future performance might not be as robust as it was past periods.

First, this is the first economic cycle that involved a bond-buying program by the Federal Reserve. The quantitative bond-buying program produced a technical anchoring effect at the long-end of the bond market that was not present in prior cycles. While this program did not cause a yield curve inversion by itself it did result in a flatter yield curve than what otherwise would have been the case, and as a result, it would not take much force from other factors to trigger an inversion in the term spread of yields.

Second, given the increased globalization of the financial markets the appeal and demand of long-dated US Treasury securities is often based on the yields available in other major economies. Long bond yields in a number of major economies (such Germany, Japan and France) are negative and many others (including the UK, Spain and Australia) are below 1% and that has led to an increase in global demand for long-dated US Treasury securities since yields in the US are in some cases 100 to 200 basis points over the yields of comparable maturities in other economies. That increased global demand for US securities is a new technical factor and unrelated to the performance of the US economy.

Third, this is the first time the inversion of the Treasury curve occurred with nominal yields at the short and long end that were well below the growth in nominal income and GDP (or the economy's yield curve). Why is that important? There is a direct negative consequence to the economy's performance when the cost of borrowing exceeds the growth in nominal income. At that point, the cost of new borrowing starts to become too costly, leading to a slowdown or a decline in credit use, and a weaker economy.

Although it is often overlooked, all of the Treasury yield curve inversions that have preceded recessions have coincided with an inversion in the economy's yield curve, or when short and long-term nominal rates were above the growth in nominal income and GDP. The fact that the Treasury yield curve has inverted at relatively low nominal yields, suggests that the interest rate channel is not producing the restrictive influences on the economy as it did during prior inversions and instead is actually providing a cushion (or stimulus) to the economy. Policymakers should take note of this unusual occurrence and not rush to ease policy further, saving its interest rate powder for another time.

If the Treasury curve inversion is not producing a restrictive influence on the economy as it did in the past can the US still experience a recession? Yes, but it would come from different channels.

The biggest recession risk today centers around the trade dispute between the US and China. Trade disputes have the potential to be very disruptive and contractionary and can operate through a number of channels, such as trade volumes and production, currencies and prices and asset markets.

Of all of these channels, the biggest vulnerability for the US is the equity channel since the market value of equities relative to income and GDP is at record highs, providing consumers with vast sums of liquidity and wealth. If the imposition of new tariffs and the uncertainty over what may follow triggers a de-risking and rush to exit, sparking a sustained 25% to 30% correction in the equity market that by itself could trigger a recession as it would deal a substantial blow to consumer liquidity and wealth, and an abrupt and sharp decline in spending and confidence.

That is not a forecast or a prediction but merely an observation that all recessions have been caused by some form of a demand shock, and the inverted yield curve merely highlighted the vulnerability of the economy to a potential bad outcome.

Critically, as Jim Grant noted recently, the spread between the 10-year and three-month yields is an important indicator, James Bianco, president and eponym of Bianco Research LLC notes today. On six occasions over the past 50 years when the three-month yield exceeded that of the 10-year, economic recession invariably followed, commencing an average of 311 days after the initial signal.

Finally, Joseph Carson, former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein, notes that recessions are far from being alike and their symptoms and causes differ over time. Despite its many shapes and sizes the historical regularity that an inverted Treasury yield curve has coincided with recession has raised concern now that yields on longer-dated Treasuries have fallen been below shorter-term yields for several months running.

The power of the term spread to predict or anticipate economic recessions needs to be respected, but there are several new domestic and global factors that are present today, suggesting that the signaling effect from changes in the Treasury yield curve directly to the economy's future performance might not be as robust as it was past periods.

First, this is the first economic cycle that involved a bond-buying program by the Federal Reserve. The quantitative bond-buying program produced a technical anchoring effect at the long-end of the bond market that was not present in prior cycles. While this program did not cause a yield curve inversion by itself it did result in a flatter yield curve than what otherwise would have been the case, and as a result, it would not take much force from other factors to trigger an inversion in the term spread of yields.

Second, given the increased globalization of the financial markets the appeal and demand of long-dated US Treasury securities is often based on the yields available in other major economies. Long bond yields in a number of major economies (such Germany, Japan and France) are negative and many others (including the UK, Spain and Australia) are below 1% and that has led to an increase in global demand for long-dated US Treasury securities since yields in the US are in some cases 100 to 200 basis points over the yields of comparable maturities in other economies. That increased global demand for US securities is a new technical factor and unrelated to the performance of the US economy.

Third, this is the first time the inversion of the Treasury curve occurred with nominal yields at the short and long end that were well below the growth in nominal income and GDP (or the economy's yield curve). Why is that important? There is a direct negative consequence to the economy's performance when the cost of borrowing exceeds the growth in nominal income. At that point, the cost of new borrowing starts to become too costly, leading to a slowdown or a decline in credit use, and a weaker economy.

Although it is often overlooked, all of the Treasury yield curve inversions that have preceded recessions have coincided with an inversion in the economy's yield curve, or when short and long-term nominal rates were above the growth in nominal income and GDP. The fact that the Treasury yield curve has inverted at relatively low nominal yields, suggests that the interest rate channel is not producing the restrictive influences on the economy as it did during prior inversions and instead is actually providing a cushion (or stimulus) to the economy. Policymakers should take note of this unusual occurrence and not rush to ease policy further, saving its interest rate powder for another time.

If the Treasury curve inversion is not producing a restrictive influence on the economy as it did in the past can the US still experience a recession? Yes, but it would come from different channels.

The biggest recession risk today centers around the trade dispute between the US and China. Trade disputes have the potential to be very disruptive and contractionary and can operate through a number of channels, such as trade volumes and production, currencies and prices and asset markets.

Of all of these channels, the biggest vulnerability for the US is the equity channel since the market value of equities relative to income and GDP is at record highs, providing consumers with vast sums of liquidity and wealth. If the imposition of new tariffs and the uncertainty over what may follow triggers a de-risking and rush to exit, sparking a sustained 25% to 30% correction in the equity market that by itself could trigger a recession as it would deal a substantial blow to consumer liquidity and wealth, and an abrupt and sharp decline in spending and confidence.

That is not a forecast or a prediction but merely an observation that all recessions have been caused by some form of a demand shock, and the inverted yield curve merely highlighted the vulnerability of the economy to a potential bad outcome.

Critically, as Jim Grant noted recently, the spread between the 10-year and three-month yields is an important indicator, James Bianco, president and eponym of Bianco Research LLC notes today. On six occasions over the past 50 years when the three-month yield exceeded that of the 10-year, economic recession invariably followed, commencing an average of 311 days after the initial signal.

Finally, Joseph Carson, former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein, notes that recessions are far from being alike and their symptoms and causes differ over time. Despite its many shapes and sizes the historical regularity that an inverted Treasury yield curve has coincided with recession has raised concern now that yields on longer-dated Treasuries have fallen been below shorter-term yields for several months running.

The power of the term spread to predict or anticipate economic recessions needs to be respected, but there are several new domestic and global factors that are present today, suggesting that the signaling effect from changes in the Treasury yield curve directly to the economy's future performance might not be as robust as it was past periods.

First, this is the first economic cycle that involved a bond-buying program by the Federal Reserve. The quantitative bond-buying program produced a technical anchoring effect at the long-end of the bond market that was not present in prior cycles. While this program did not cause a yield curve inversion by itself it did result in a flatter yield curve than what otherwise would have been the case, and as a result, it would not take much force from other factors to trigger an inversion in the term spread of yields.

Second, given the increased globalization of the financial markets the appeal and demand of long-dated US Treasury securities is often based on the yields available in other major economies. Long bond yields in a number of major economies (such Germany, Japan and France) are negative and many others (including the UK, Spain and Australia) are below 1% and that has led to an increase in global demand for long-dated US Treasury securities since yields in the US are in some cases 100 to 200 basis points over the yields of comparable maturities in other economies. That increased global demand for US securities is a new technical factor and unrelated to the performance of the US economy.

Third, this is the first time the inversion of the Treasury curve occurred with nominal yields at the short and long end that were well below the growth in nominal income and GDP (or the economy's yield curve). Why is that important? There is a direct negative consequence to the economy's performance when the cost of borrowing exceeds the growth in nominal income. At that point, the cost of new borrowing starts to become too costly, leading to a slowdown or a decline in credit use, and a weaker economy.

Although it is often overlooked, all of the Treasury yield curve inversions that have preceded recessions have coincided with an inversion in the economy's yield curve, or when short and long-term nominal rates were above the growth in nominal income and GDP. The fact that the Treasury yield curve has inverted at relatively low nominal yields, suggests that the interest rate channel is not producing the restrictive influences on the economy as it did during prior inversions and instead is actually providing a cushion (or stimulus) to the economy. Policymakers should take note of this unusual occurrence and not rush to ease policy further, saving its interest rate powder for another time.

If the Treasury curve inversion is not producing a restrictive influence on the economy as it did in the past can the US still experience a recession? Yes, but it would come from different channels.

The biggest recession risk today centers around the trade dispute between the US and China. Trade disputes have the potential to be very disruptive and contractionary and can operate through a number of channels, such as trade volumes and production, currencies and prices and asset markets.

Of all of these channels, the biggest vulnerability for the US is the equity channel since the market value of equities relative to income and GDP is at record highs, providing consumers with vast sums of liquidity and wealth. If the imposition of new tariffs and the uncertainty over what may follow triggers a de-risking and rush to exit, sparking a sustained 25% to 30% correction in the equity market that by itself could trigger a recession as it would deal a substantial blow to consumer liquidity and wealth, and an abrupt and sharp decline in spending and confidence.

That is not a forecast or a prediction but merely an observation that all recessions have been caused by some form of a demand shock, and the inverted yield curve merely highlighted the vulnerability of the economy to a potential bad outcome.

Critically, as Jim Grant noted recently, the spread between the 10-year and three-month yields is an important indicator, James Bianco, president and eponym of Bianco Research LLC notes today. On six occasions over the past 50 years when the three-month yield exceeded that of the 10-year, economic recession invariably followed, commencing an average of 311 days after the initial signal.

Finally, Joseph Carson, former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein, notes that recessions are far from being alike and their symptoms and causes differ over time. Despite its many shapes and sizes the historical regularity that an inverted Treasury yield curve has coincided with recession has raised concern now that yields on longer-dated Treasuries have fallen been below shorter-term yields for several months running.

The power of the term spread to predict or anticipate economic recessions needs to be respected, but there are several new domestic and global factors that are present today, suggesting that the signaling effect from changes in the Treasury yield curve directly to the economy's future performance might not be as robust as it was past periods.

First, this is the first economic cycle that involved a bond-buying program by the Federal Reserve. The quantitative bond-buying program produced a technical anchoring effect at the long-end of the bond market that was not present in prior cycles. While this program did not cause a yield curve inversion by itself it did result in a flatter yield curve than what otherwise would have been the case, and as a result, it would not take much force from other factors to trigger an inversion in the term spread of yields.

Second, given the increased globalization of the financial markets the appeal and demand of long-dated US Treasury securities is often based on the yields available in other major economies. Long bond yields in a number of major economies (such Germany, Japan and France) are negative and many others (including the UK, Spain and Australia) are below 1% and that has led to an increase in global demand for long-dated US Treasury securities since yields in the US are in some cases 100 to 200 basis points over the yields of comparable maturities in other economies. That increased global demand for US securities is a new technical factor and unrelated to the performance of the US economy.

Third, this is the first time the inversion of the Treasury curve occurred with nominal yields at the short and long end that were well below the growth in nominal income and GDP (or the economy's yield curve). Why is that important? There is a direct negative consequence to the economy's performance when the cost of borrowing exceeds the growth in nominal income. At that point, the cost of new borrowing starts to become too costly, leading to a slowdown or a decline in credit use, and a weaker economy.

Although it is often overlooked, all of the Treasury yield curve inversions that have preceded recessions have coincided with an inversion in the economy's yield curve, or when short and long-term nominal rates were above the growth in nominal income and GDP. The fact that the Treasury yield curve has inverted at relatively low nominal yields, suggests that the interest rate channel is not producing the restrictive influences on the economy as it did during prior inversions and instead is actually providing a cushion (or stimulus) to the economy. Policymakers should take note of this unusual occurrence and not rush to ease policy further, saving its interest rate powder for another time.

If the Treasury curve inversion is not producing a restrictive influence on the economy as it did in the past can the US still experience a recession? Yes, but it would come from different channels.

The biggest recession risk today centers around the trade dispute between the US and China. Trade disputes have the potential to be very disruptive and contractionary and can operate through a number of channels, such as trade volumes and production, currencies and prices and asset markets.

Of all of these channels, the biggest vulnerability for the US is the equity channel since the market value of equities relative to income and GDP is at record highs, providing consumers with vast sums of liquidity and wealth. If the imposition of new tariffs and the uncertainty over what may follow triggers a de-risking and rush to exit, sparking a sustained 25% to 30% correction in the equity market that by itself could trigger a recession as it would deal a substantial blow to consumer liquidity and wealth, and an abrupt and sharp decline in spending and confidence.

That is not a forecast or a prediction but merely an observation that all recessions have been caused by some form of a demand shock, and the inverted yield curve merely highlighted the vulnerability of the economy to a potential bad.

Critically, as Jim Grant noted recently, the spread between the 10-year and three-month yields is an important indicator, James Bianco, president and eponym of Bianco Research LLC notes today. On six occasions over the past 50 years when the three-month yield exceeded that of the 10-year, economic recession invariably followed, commencing an average of 311 days after the initial signal.

Finally, Joseph Carson, former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein, notes that recessions are far from being alike and their symptoms and causes differ over time. Despite its many shapes and sizes the historical regularity that an inverted Treasury yield curve has coincided with recession has raised concern now that yields on longer-dated Treasuries have fallen been below shorter-term yields for several months running.

The power of the term spread to predict or anticipate economic recessions needs to be respected, but there are several new domestic and global factors that are present today, suggesting that the signaling effect from changes in the Treasury yield curve directly to the economy's future performance might not be as robust as it was past periods.

First, this is the first economic cycle that involved a bond-buying program by the Federal Reserve. The quantitative bond-buying program produced a technical anchoring effect at the long-end of the bond market that was not present in prior cycles. While this program did not cause a yield curve inversion by itself it did result in a flatter yield curve than what otherwise would have been the case, and as a result, it would not take much force from other factors to trigger an inversion in the term spread of yields.

Second, given the increased globalization of the financial markets the appeal and demand of long-dated US Treasury securities is often based on the yields available in other major economies. Long bond yields in a number of major economies (such Germany, Japan and France) are negative and many others (including the UK, Spain and Australia) are below 1% and that has led to an increase in global demand for long-dated US Treasury securities since yields in the US are in some cases 100 to 200 basis points over the yields of comparable maturities in other economies. That increased global demand for US securities is a new technical factor and unrelated to the performance of the US economy.

Third, this is the first time the inversion of the Treasury curve occurred with nominal yields at the short and long end that were well below the growth in nominal income and GDP (or the economy's yield curve). Why is that important? There is a direct negative consequence to the economy's performance when the cost of borrowing exceeds the growth in nominal income. At that point, the cost of new borrowing starts to become too costly, leading to a slowdown or a decline in credit use, and a weaker economy.

Although it is often overlooked, all of the Treasury yield curve inversions that have preceded recessions have coincided with an inversion in the economy's yield curve, or when short and long-term nominal rates were above the growth in nominal income and GDP. The fact that the Treasury yield curve has inverted at relatively low nominal yields, suggests that the interest rate channel is not producing the restrictive influences on the economy as it did during prior inversions and instead is actually providing a cushion (or stimulus) to the economy. Policymakers should take note of this unusual occurrence and not rush to ease policy further, saving its interest rate powder for another time.

If the Treasury curve inversion is not producing a restrictive influence on the economy as it did in the past can the US still experience a recession? Yes, but it would come from different channels.

The biggest recession risk today centers around the trade dispute between the US and China. Trade disputes have the potential to be very disruptive and contractionary and can operate through a number of channels, such as trade volumes and production, currencies and prices and asset markets.

Of all of these channels, the biggest vulnerability for the US is the equity channel since the market value of equities relative to income and GDP is at record highs, providing consumers with vast sums of liquidity and wealth. If the imposition of new tariffs and the uncertainty over what may follow triggers a de-risking and rush to exit, sparking a sustained 25% to 30% correction in the equity market that by itself could trigger a recession as it would deal a substantial blow to consumer liquidity and wealth, and an abrupt and sharp decline in spending and confidence.

That is not a forecast or a prediction but merely an observation that all recessions have been caused by some form of a demand shock, and the inverted yield curve merely highlighted the vulnerability of the economy to a potential bad outcome.

Friday 0.88?

August dividend?

AGM?

TP 0.90?

Target 0.90 after QR1..kikiki..

BEIJING (April 25): Malaysia has signed a framework of agreement with China this afternoon to revive the Bandar Malaysia project -- the massive real estate development at the former air-base near Sungai Besi.

The signing of the framework agreement was witnessed by Prime Minster Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad and China's premier Li Keqiang.

KUALA LUMPUR (April 24): Malaysia Building Society Bhd (MBSB) Bank has launched a deposit campaign with total cash prizes of almost RM2 million in a bid to attract new customers.

The PrimeWin RM1,000,000 CASA-i will run from now until April 30, 2020, and is open to the bank's savings and current account holders.

The campaign carries a grand prize of RM1 million and total cash prizes worth close to RM2 million.

Depositors have an opportunity to win the cash prize through the financial institution's monthly and quarterly draws throughout the campaign period.

"With this campaign, we will be able to reward our current customers as well as draw new customers to experience banking with MBSB Bank," said its group president and chief executive Datuk Seri Ahmad Zaini Othman.

Ahmad Zaini said the bank will be implementing further digitalisation of its operations, which includes introducing mobile application and digital branches to its customers.

It will also introduce its first debit card, the MBSB Bank Visa Debit Card-i.

On the relocation of its headquarters to PJ Sentral, Ahmad Zaini said: "The new building has our employees' best interests in mind. Not only is it a green building, it will have an activity-based workplace concept, a working environment that allows for collaborative workspace, (and) creative engagement resulting in a happy and productive workforce."

"It will also be equipped with a creche, a facility that is not embraced widely by most companies in Malaysia," he added.

At 3.55pm, MBSB's shares rose 0.5 sen or 0.51% to 98.5 sen, valuing the group at RM6.26 billion. Some 1.42 million shares changed hands.

KUALA LUMPUR (April 24): Malaysia Building Society Bhd (MBSB) Bank has launched a deposit campaign with total cash prizes of almost RM2 million in a bid to attract new customers.

The PrimeWin RM1,000,000 CASA-i will run from now until April 30, 2020, and is open to the bank's savings and current account holders.

The campaign carries a grand prize of RM1 million and total cash prizes worth close to RM2 million.

Depositors have an opportunity to win the cash prize through the financial institution's monthly and quarterly draws throughout the campaign period.

"With this campaign, we will be able to reward our current customers as well as draw new customers to experience banking with MBSB Bank," said its group president and chief executive Datuk Seri Ahmad Zaini Othman.

Ahmad Zaini said the bank will be implementing further digitalisation of its operations, which includes introducing mobile application and digital branches to its customers.

It will also introduce its first debit card, the MBSB Bank Visa Debit Card-i.

On the relocation of its headquarters to PJ Sentral, Ahmad Zaini said: "The new building has our employees' best interests in mind. Not only is it a green building, it will have an activity-based workplace concept, a working environment that allows for collaborative workspace, (and) creative engagement resulting in a happy and productive workforce."

"It will also be equipped with a creche, a facility that is not embraced widely by most companies in Malaysia," he added.

At 3.55pm, MBSB's shares rose 0.5 sen or 0.51% to 98.5 sen, valuing the group at RM6.26 billion. Some 1.42 million shares changed hands.

KUALA LUMPUR (April 24): Malaysia Building Society Bhd (MBSB) Bank has launched a deposit campaign with total cash prizes of almost RM2 million in a bid to attract new customers.

The PrimeWin RM1,000,000 CASA-i will run from now until April 30, 2020, and is open to the bank's savings and current account holders.

The campaign carries a grand prize of RM1 million and total cash prizes worth close to RM2 million.

Depositors have an opportunity to win the cash prize through the financial institution's monthly and quarterly draws throughout the campaign period.

"With this campaign, we will be able to reward our current customers as well as draw new customers to experience banking with MBSB Bank," said its group president and chief executive Datuk Seri Ahmad Zaini Othman.

Ahmad Zaini said the bank will be implementing further digitalisation of its operations, which includes introducing mobile application and digital branches to its customers.

It will also introduce its first debit card, the MBSB Bank Visa Debit Card-i.

On the relocation of its headquarters to PJ Sentral, Ahmad Zaini said: "The new building has our employees' best interests in mind. Not only is it a green building, it will have an activity-based workplace concept, a working environment that allows for collaborative workspace, (and) creative engagement resulting in a happy and productive workforce."

"It will also be equipped with a creche, a facility that is not embraced widely by most companies in Malaysia," he added.

At 3.55pm, MBSB's shares rose 0.5 sen or 0.51% to 98.5 sen, valuing the group at RM6.26 billion. Some 1.42 million shares changed hands.