KEY STOCK DATA
P/E Ratio (TTM)
7.86(09/18/23)
EPS (TTM)
RM0.13
Market Cap
RM4.25 B
Shares Outstanding
4.21 B
Public Float
2.27 B
Yield
5099 is not currently paying a regular dividend.




Balance Sheet

Jun 2023 Qtr (millions)

Asset
Cash 735
AR 1103
Inventory 293
Current Asset 2,270
Fixed Asset 13,906
Total Asset 27,758

Liabilities and Equities
STDebt 6249
AP 1226
Other CL 6702
Current Liability 14,209

LTDebt 17,632

Total Liabilities 37,963

Equity
Common stock 8660
Retained Earnings (15,659)
Total Equities (8,391)



Total Equity/Total Asset - 30.23%
Current Ratio 0.16

Balance Sheet

Jun 2023 Qtr (millions)


Cash 735
STDebt 6249
LTDebt 17,632



AR 1103
AP 1226



Current Asset 2,270
Current Liability 14,209
Current Ratio 0.16


Other CL 6702


Fixed Asset 13,906
Total Asset 27,758
Total Liabilities 37,963
Total Equities (8,391)

Total Equity/Total Asset - 30.23%



Equity
Common stock 8660
Retained Earnings (15,659)

>>>

Posted by skoh888 > Sep 18, 2023 10:05 AM | Report Abuse

You twisting longkang clown, read carefully! It was never about palm oil stock! Its about you and the way you promote stocks. maybe you dont know how to read or are just a great twister and manipulative character

>>>>

... and he promoted so many stocks in this forum!

Earnings appear cyclical.
Its EPSs were higher in the years 2009 to 2016 compared to the years 2017 to 2022.
Its PERs similarly was cyclical, were lower in the years 2009 to 2016 (PE ranged 10.6 to 15.7) compared to the years 2017 to 2022 (PE ranged from 21.9 to 29.0).

The company has been profitable during this period. Its earnings over these years were essentially flat.
It has been generous in paying 94.5% of its earnings as dividends. Its dividend yield at its various prices ranged from a low of 5.93% to 9.02%.

How to benefit from investing in this stock long term?
Not much growth over the long term. Essentially for income (its dividends).

As usual do not buy when its price is "high". When is its price high and when is it low?
2 methods can be used:
1. Buy when its EPS is at the lowest and its PE is near the highest. This usually corresponds to low price.
2. Buy when its DY is at the upper end of its DY. This also reflects that it is priced low.

At the current price of RM 5.14 per share, it is trading at a
PER = 13.53E and DY = 6.81E


Trading at fair price.

YEAR .. DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 .. 11.25 .. 26.15 .. 2.78
2010 .. 15 .. 25.6 .. 3.01
2011 .. 19.25 .. 22.32 .. 2.87
2012 .. 20 .. 27.18 .. 3.29
2013 .. 20 .. 40.1 .. 4.7
2014 .. 25 .. 41.84 .. 4.4
2015 .. 25 .. 33.95 .. 5.71
2016 .. 25 .. 33.32 .. 5.24
2017 .. 30 .. 18.42 .. 4.45
2018 .. 25 .. 14.18 .. 3.63
2019 .. 20 .. 22.13 .. 3.6
2020 .. 20 .. 17.25 .. 3.78
2021 .. 30 .. 19.11 .. 3.62
2022 .. 50 .. 13.31 .. 3.86
2023 .. 35.00E .. 39.02P .. 5.14

*Cumulative 14 years (sen) 2009 to 2022
*Total cum. EPS 354.86
*Total cum. DPS 335.5
Tot Retain Earns 19.36
DPO Ratio 94.5%

For every $1 earnings retained, we expect company to deliver $1 increment in share price.
For the amount retained of 0.19 , its share price has gained or lost 2.36

Hallmark of Success for Hard-Asset-Based Businesses

Cost leadership: Because hard-asset-based companies have large fixed costs, those that deliver their products most efficiently have a strong advantage and can achieve superior financial performance, such as Southwest in the airline industry. Firms don't usually advertise their cost structures per se, so to get an idea about how efficiently a company operatees, look at its fixed assets turnover, operating margins, and ROIC - and compare its numbers to industry peers.

Unique assets: When limited assets are required to fulfill the delivery of a particular service, ownership of those assets is key. For example, Waste Management's numerous, well-located landfill assets represent a significant competitive advantage and brrier to entry in the waste management market because it's unlikely that enough new landfill locations will get government approval to diminish its share of this business.

Prudent financing: Remember, having a load of debt is not itself a bad thing. Having a load of debt that cannot be easily financed by the cash flow of the business is a reccipe for disaster. When analyzing companies with high debt, always be sure that the debt can be serviced from free cash flow, even under a downside scenario.

(Some Malaysian companies in this hard-asset-based businesses are Air Asia, MAS, Maybulk and Transmile.)

Understanding the business model: Hard-Asset-Based Businesses

Companies in the hard-asset-based subsector depend on big investments in fixed assets to grow their businesses. Airlines, waste haulers (Waste Management, Allied Waste, Republic Services), and expedited delivery companies (FedEx, UPS) all fall into this subsector.

In general, these companies aren't as attractive as technology-based businesses, but investors can still find some wide-moat stocks and good investments in this area.

Industry Structure

Growth for hard-asset-based businesses inevitably requires large incremental outlays for fixed assets. After all, once an airline is flyinng full planes, the only way to get more passengers from point A to point B is to acquire an additional aircraft, which can cost $35 million or more.

Because the incremental fixed investment occurs before asset deployment, companies in this sector generally finance their growth with external funding. Debt can be used to finance almost all of the asset's cost, so lenders generally require the asset to provide collateral against the loan. With this model, high leverage is not necessarily a bad thing, provided that the company can make enough money deploying the asset to cover the cost of debt financing and earn a reasonable return for shareholders.

With this in mind, airlines are generally the least attractive investment of all the companies in this subsector. Airlines must bear enormous fixed costs to maintain their fleets and meet the demands of expensive labour contracts, yet they sell a commodity service that's difficult to differentiate. As a result price competition is intense, profit margins are razor-thin - and often non-existent - and operating leverage is so high that the firms can swing from being wildly profitable to nearly bankrupt in a short time. If you don't think this sounds like a recipe for good long-term investments, you're right - airlines have lost a collective $11 billion (excluding the impact of recent government handouts) between deregulation in 1987 and 2002. Over the same time period, 125 airlines had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and 12 of them filed for Chapter 7 liquidation.

But despite the terrible performance for airlines in general, a few carriers have fared very well. Southwest, for one, has been profitable for 30 consecutive years - an amazing achievement considering the cyclicality of its business and the dismal operating environment for the industry in 2002. Southwest's superior financial performance is largely because of its main strategic advantage: a low cost structure driven by its practice of flying one type of aircraft for all its no frills, point-to-point routes. In an industry with less-than-desirable fundamentals, Southwest has achieved superior financial results by deploying a different and dominant, business strategy.

Other characteristics of hard-asset-based businesses make this segment worth watching. The idea of limited or shrinking assets, for example, can go a long way to provide stability in the competitive landscape for these companies. Because of the NIMBY (not in my back yard) principle, it is very difficult to get approval for new landfill sites. As a result, it is highly unlikely that new competitors will enter the landfill side of the waste management business. That puts a company such as Waste Management, which owns 40 percent of the total U.S. disposal capacity via its 300 landfills, at an advantage.

The majority of hard-asset-based companies fall into the narrow- or no-moat buckets. With few, if any, competitive advantages for many of these companies, investors should look for a pretty steep discount to a fair value estimate before buying shares.

Airline industry

This is a most challenging and difficult industry indeed.
Since the Wright's brothers first flight, the airline industry as an aggregate has destroyed more capital over the many years.
Buffett joked that he has a toll free number to remind him not to invest in airlines. Yet, he conveniently forgot, and invested in 2019 and then divested of these very quickly when the Covid pandemic struck.

The airline industry is one where despite growth in the industry as a whole, with more people flying worldwide; and yet, the wealth created by the industry for the invested capital remained elusive.

Many airline casualties in the past.

Growth can be both good and bad. It is worthwhile reminding ourselves of this.

Capital A

YEAR .. DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX ..
2009 .. 0 .. 14.57 .. 1.34 ..
2010 .. 0 .. 15.33 .. 2.45 ..
2011 .. 2.68 .. 25.96 .. 3.65 ..
2012 .. 4.84 .. 14.47 .. 2.65 ..
2013 .. 23.23 .. 30.3 .. 2.13 ..
2014 .. 3.87 .. 2.88 .. 2.63 ..
2015 .. 2.9 .. 18.82 .. 1.25 ..
2016 .. 3.87 .. 56.39 .. 2.22 ..
2017 .. 11.61 .. 28.78 .. 3.24 ..
2018 .. 50.32 .. 28.23 .. 2.87 ..
2019 .. 98.71 .. -5.04 .. 1.65 ..
2020 .. 0 .. -157.43 .. 0.86 ..
2021 .. 0 .. -73.31 .. 0.79 ..
2022 .. 0 .. -59.59 .. 0.63 ..


*Cumulative 14 years 2009 to 2022
*Total cum. EPS -59.64
*Total cum. DPS 202.03
Tot Retain Earns -261.67
DPO Ratio -338.7%


From 2009 to 2019:
Its accumulated total EPS = 230.69 sen
It paid a total accumulated DPS = 202.03 sen.

From 2020 to 2022, airline sector was badly hit by the Covid pandemic.

My simple criteria: Are the earnings consistent and growing?

Each time you decide to continue to hold a stock, you are in fact making a new buying decision.

Understanding the business life cycle outlined above will enable you to identify companies that are about to emerge as great dividend payers, as well as help you to spot the mature companies headed down the road to extinction.

AT&T is a great example of a company currently in decline, possibly on its way to extinction.

Beware of attempting to buy or hold the stock of a company in the final stages of its business life cycle.

At one time, AT&T was the most widely held stock in America. The company paid its first dividend in 1893 and became known as the widows and orphans stock because it was such a consistent source of dividend payments for investors. AT&T's history dates back to 1875. The company's founder, Alexander Graham Bell, invented the telphone and together with several investors started the American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. As a telephone company, AT&T was so successful it achieved regulated monopoly status. In 1984, the US Department of Justice broke the AT&T monopoly into eight companies: seven regional operating "Bells" and AT&T.

For most of its history, AT&T had been largely insulated from market pressures and competitive forces. After the break up, smaller and leaner communication companies stole AT&T's market share, first through price competition and later by becoming product innovators. For the new AT&T to successfully compete in an unregulated environment, it would require a drastic change in corporate culture. Over the past few years, operations and profits have continued to decline, and AT&T is now struggling to survive.

AT&T's story of dominance and decline highlights the constant need for you to follow up your initial purchase analysis with a routine review to see if the companies you hold are performing as expected.

Business and Dividend Life Cycles
Start Up
Growth Rate 20%
Dividend Payout Ratio 0%

Early Growth
Growth Rate 30%
Dividend Payout Ratio 0%


Late Stage Growth
Growth Rate 35%
Dividend Payout Ratio 15%


Expansion
Growth Rate 25%
Dividend Payout Ratio 30%


Maturity
Growth Rate 20%
Dividend Payout Ratio 55%


Decline
Growth Rate < 5% and declining
Dividend Payout Ratio < 20%

Business and Dividend Life Cycles
Business life cycles are most influenced by access to resources and capital.


A company's success and development are also affected by a host of outside factors - competition from companies in the same industry, economic conditions, even changing consumer preferences.


There are 6 phases in a company's development that influence its dividend policy:


1. The Start-Up Phase: In the start-up phase, someone invest cash for stock in the business to develop products, hire employees, pay for equipment, and rent space. It is not unusual for a company to raise seed money from professional investors and enter the start-up phase with a hundred or more employees. A small company needs to plow all profits back into growing and perfecting its business model to survive.


2. The Early Growth Phase: If the company launch is successful, it will enter the early growth phase. As the demand for its products and services increases, sales and profits increase. The company will need to reinvest all cash flow and profit to achieve competitive scale.


3. The Late Stage Growth Phase: In the late stage growth phase, the company continues to grow and may begin to pay a small dividend, usually 10 to 15% of earnings. This is a clear signal to investors that the company has reached a level of stability in profits and cash flow necessary to support a dividend.


4. The Expansion Phase: If the company is well run, it will enter the expansion phase. Its rate of growth may slow as competitors take some of the company's market share. Companies at this stage generally increase their dividend payout ratio to approximately 30 to 40% of earnings.


5. The Maturity Phase: Companies can continue to expand even as they reach their maturity phase, but their growth rate usually slows measurably. Well-run mature companies can continue to be a competitive force in their respective industries for decades or even several generations. Many of the companies in this group are mature companies, a few over a century old. It is during this stage that companies tend to increase their dividend payout ratios to 50 to 60% of earnings, which provides investors with generous dividend income.


6. The Decline Phase: In the later stages, many companies fail to innovate - to keep their competitive advantage. These companies will enter the decline phase, and unless they reinvent themselves, they will eventually cease to exist. In this phase, as sales and profits decline, they will eventually reduce or eliminate their dividend payouts.


Beware of attempting to buy or hold the stock of a company in the final stages of its business life cycle.

>>>>

Posted by calvintaneng > 3 weeks ago | Report Abuse

There is a time line for wealth

1) Future Wealth

2) Present Wealth

3) Past Wealth

Future, present & past Wealth? What are they?

So I avoid buying stocks with "future growth" hype. Selectively buying Present Growth Stock if I SEE VALUE. And love buying into PAST WEALTH STOCKS OF IMMENSE VALUE SELLING AT DEEP DEEP DISCOUNT


I avoid the young man company with hope of future wealth. I will buy some (only selectively) the mature company of present wealth if they sell at reasonable prices. I concentrate on Deep Value Stocks of PAST ACCUMULATED WEALTH SELLING AT DEEP DISCOUNT

>>>>


calvintaneng does not seem to have a strong investing philosophy. He has written so much and this revealed his weakness.

When he sold 8 houses and bought into NETX, what was he doing in his investing? Was he investing into an established company selling at a discount? Was he not investing into a hype or his perceived GROWTH STOCK, which he had to agree today, that he bought at too exuberant a price too?

Insas

*Cumulative 14 years 2009 to 2022
*Total cum. EPS (sen) 156.96
*Total cum. DPS (sen) 13.25
Total cum. Retained Earnings (sen) 143.71
DPO Ratio 8.4%


FY end price 2009 RM 0.45
FY end price 2023 RM 0.90
For every RM 1 earnings retained, we expect company to deliver RM 1 increment in share price.
For the amount retained of 143.71 sen or RM 1.4371, its share price has gained only RM 0.45.


Insas is either a very lousy company and priced accordingly, or a very lousy company that is very undervalued.


Quote

Gary Shilling:
The stock market has been rallying since August, and the markets usually do anticipate recoveries. They’ve anticipated twelve of the last eight, I think. Of course, you need to keep in mind that the stock market can remain irrational a lot longer than you can remain solvent.

YEAR .. DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 .. 0 .. 0.34 .. 0.45
2010 .. 0 .. 5.72 .. 0.45
2011 .. 0 .. 11.99 .. 0.39
2012 .. 0 .. 1.5 .. 0.36
2013 .. 0.81 .. 7.62 .. 0.72
2014 .. 0.82 .. 19.88 .. 0.65
2015 .. 0.89 .. 12.25 .. 0.69
2016 .. 0.89 .. 10.41 .. 0.63
2017 .. 0.89 .. 22.2 .. 0.83
2018 .. 0.89 .. 14.61 .. 0.6
2019 .. 1.78 .. 11.77 .. 0.73
2020 .. 1.78 .. 1.99 .. 0.84
2021 .. 2 .. 23.99 .. 0.97
2022 .. 2.5 .. 12.69 .. 0.81




Performance Info
ROE - 5 Yr Avg 6.77
ROE - Latest FY 9.81
PX Growth Rate - 5 Yr Avg (%) 8.38
DPS Growth Rate - 5 Yr Avg (%) 22.90
EPS Growth Rate - 5 Yr Avg (%) 0.84


From 2009 to 2022, its DPO ratio = 8.4%

>>>

Posted by StingRay > 1 day ago | Report Abuse

Want to know a conman?...

One more observation that I forgotten to point out. If you see a person desperately promote something, then something is not right. When I say desperately... that means day and night and seven days a week. Non stop promoting. A good product don't need such desperate promotion. You don't see that happening for good product. Correct? 🤣

-------

What is so difficult to identify who is a conman? Just Google lah. Plenty of write up on that...

How do con artists behave?
They have an inflated view of themselves, and they're really shameless in their self-promotion. They can also be impulsive: they engage in dangerous behavior and obviously commit crimes without any regard for the impact it can have on others." Con artists also tend to very confident and cocky.25 Apr 2022

The above gave a simple narration of how to identify a conman. Someone that is egoistic and never back down. When people question his or her motive or data presented, he or she usually goes mad and starts a personal attack on the people who question him or her while deflecting answering a legitimate question. The personal attack could be derived from the make up story by not revealing the entire scenario or truth. He or she only uses data that could assist him or her in the con. Keep repeating a lie in the hope that the people will believe in his or her lies. He or she needs to get people to believe him or her by discrediting others. When failed, they will emerge using another identity.

Anyway, don't take my word for it loh. Just go do your own research on how a scammer or conman behaves and I am very sure, you will find a match. 🤣🤣🤣

>>>

https://www.therakyatpost.com/living/2023/04/18/sweden-just-became-the-worlds-1st-smoke-free-country-can-malaysia-do-the-same/?utm_source=taboola&utm_medium=referral&tblci=GiDg5zQQRvqRZOeLrpMr1D2BX5eUZMqP58Hqyr5ELaSOUyC2olYox7-s4qfF3ILOAQ#tblciGiDg5zQQRvqRZOeLrpMr1D2BX5eUZMqP58Hqyr5ELaSOUyC2olYox7-s4qfF3ILOAQ

https://www.therakyatpost.com/living/2023/04/18/sweden-just-became-the-worlds-1st-smoke-free-country-can-malaysia-do-the-same/?utm_source=taboola&utm_medium=referral&tblci=GiDg5zQQRvqRZOeLrpMr1D2BX5eUZMqP58Hqyr5ELaSOUyC2olYox7-s4qfF3ILOAQ#tblciGiDg5zQQRvqRZOeLrpMr1D2BX5eUZMqP58Hqyr5ELaSOUyC2olYox7-s4qfF3ILOAQ

Hibiscus

YEAR .. DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2011 .. 0 .. 0 .. 0.89
2012 .. 0 .. -1.1 .. 1.33
2013MAR .. 0 .. -2.7 .. 1.65
2013 .. 0 .. -0.33 .. 1.65
2014 .. 0 .. CFY .. 0.8
2015 .. 0 .. -5.07 .. 0.22
2016 .. 0 .. -14.1 .. 0.39
2017 .. 0 .. 5.65 .. 0.84
2018 .. 0 .. 0.54 .. 0.84
2019 .. 0 .. 14.72 .. 0.94
2020 .. 0 .. 3.73 .. 0.58
2021 .. 0.5 .. 5.58 .. 0.82
2022 .. 2 .. 18.82 .. 1.07

A lot of headwinds for many years already.

YEAR .. DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 .. 37.28 .. 30.92 .. 4.08
2010 .. 15.02 .. 26.92 .. 4.23
2011 .. 19.72 .. 24.55 .. 4.12
2012 .. 23.94 .. 28.66 .. 4.18
2013 .. 15.36 .. 26.61 .. 3.89
2014 .. 18.03 .. 24.16 .. 3.45
2015 .. 20.62 .. 26.8 .. 3
2016 .. 17.68 .. 22.67 .. 2.91
2017 .. 13.75 .. 18.25 .. 2.2
2018 .. 15.71 .. 14.93 .. 2.07
2019 .. 15.71 .. 17.06 .. 2.53
2020 .. 7.93 .. 9.84 .. 2.17
2021 .. 7.93 .. 13.4 .. 1.88
2022 .. 7 .. 12.01 .. 1.62


YEPX = Year End Share Price

EPS has been decreasing since 2009.

Historical Performance of BAT

YEAR .. DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX .. PER
2009 .. 250 .. 261.54 .. 42.8 .. 16.4
2010 .. 239 .. 256.05 .. 45 .. 17.6
2011 .. 273 .. 252.03 .. 49.92 .. 19.8
2012 .. 261 .. 279.39 .. 62 .. 22.2
2013 .. 281 .. 288.39 .. 64.12 .. 22.2
2014 .. 309 .. 315.9 .. 65.1 .. 20.6
2015 .. 312 .. 318.73 .. 56.08 .. 17.6
2016 .. 233 .. 236.44 .. 44.6 .. 18.9
2017 .. 249 .. 175.77 .. 40 .. 22.8
2018 .. 151 .. 164.09 .. 36.08 .. 22.0
2019 .. 132 .. 126.47 .. 15.08 .. 11.9
2020 .. 89 .. 91.29 .. 14.08 .. 15.4
2021 .. 98 .. 103.02 .. 13.98 .. 13.6
2022 .. 94 .. 98.41 .. 11.22 .. 11.4


YEPX = Year End Share Price

Historical Performance of Hua Yang

YEAR .. DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 .. 0.53 .. 2.48 .. 0.21
2010 .. 0.63 .. 3.61 .. 0.33
2011 .. 1.9 .. 7.86 .. 0.53
2012 .. 5.06 .. 16.55 .. 0.92
2013 .. 6.75 .. 20.02 .. 1.44
2014 .. 9 .. 23.34 .. 1.54
2015 .. 9.75 .. 31.41 .. 1.39
2016 .. 3.75 .. 31.27 .. 1.13
2017 .. 4 .. 17.59 .. 0.61
2018 .. 0 .. 1.68 .. 0.35
2019 .. 0 .. -4.56 .. 0.36
2020 .. 0 .. 0.45 .. 0.28
2021 .. 0 .. -14.48 .. 0.27
2022 .. 0 .. -5 .. 0.17

YEPX = Year End Price RM

False investment prophets aplenty in the internet. "The 5 stocks that will make you very rich." :-)

Putting in FD long term is also risky. Inflation risk.

FBMKLCI 1,449.58
DATE 14.9.2023

MYR (millions)
Total Mkt Cap 1,698,450
Mkt Cap (Top100) 1,395,376
Mkt Cap (Top 30) 1,024,878
Mkt Cap (Top 20) 874,030
Mkt Cap (Top 10) 618,795

The Importance of Integrity
Warren Buffett looks at three character traits in people who surround him: integrity, energy and intelligence. He says, if you don't have the first, the last two will kill you. In fact, if they don't have integrity, he would rather his managers be lazy and dumb.

"Integrity is like oxygen. If you don't have it, nothing else matters."

"Be honest. Never lie under any circumstances. Just basically lay it out as you see it. Simply speak openly and frankly."

Integrity is also about principles, full disclosure and openness.

Integrity is a choice, and the lack of it most often leads to self destruction.



The Value of a Good Reputation

"Conduct all business way inside the lines. and if it is near the line or on the line don't do it." This advice would keep you out of trouble.

"Never do anything in business that you wouldn't want printed on the front page of your local newspaper written by an intelligent but critical reporter."

Always be on the lookout for managers and business with excellent reputations as possible acquisitions.

"It takes twenty years to build a reputation and only five minutes to ruin it. If you'd think about that, you'll do things differently."

"He that is of the opinion that money will do everything may well be suspected of doing everything for money." (Benjamin Franklin)



Respect Yourself and Others

Follow the rules of common courtesy and political politeness. Answer all letters promptly with a lighthearted one-paragraph reply.

"Of the billionaires I have known, money just brings out the basic traits in them. If they were jerks before they had money they are simply jerks with a billion dollars." (Warren Buffett)



Good Character, Strong Ethics

Business success and wealth creation can be achieved with the highest ethical standards and without shady, questionable practices.

Warren Buffett treats his shareholders like partners and has created wealth with them, not at their expense.

Character is tested most in defeat or when you have great power or great wealth. A powerful man in business has stood the test of time and power.

One of the most powerful messages Buffett delivers in his humorous style is this: Make a list of all the traits you admire and respect in others. Think of people close to you or even those who have passed away. His point is that whatever character traits you put on your list, you can adopt those same qualities and be that person. Warren Buffett also suggests to his student audiences to make another list of the character traits that they don't admire or respect in others. If you think about it and put some effort to it, you too can avoid all of the negative characteristics of the person you don't want to be.

Character cannot be hidden or faked. You can tell if someone is the type of person with whom you want to associate.

A German motto says this, "When wealth is lost, nothing is lost; when health is lost, something is lost; when character is lost, all is lost."

<<<<
Posted by SEE_Research > 32 minutes ago | Report Abuse

Posted by Berlin > 1 week ago | Report Abuse
in Tiasa forum

Calvin, you are full of baloney and reek of hypocrisy.


Highlighting that Fong Siling and Neoh Soon Kean holds a few million shares and urge others to follow but when second largest shareholder sells some 6 million shares, you got nothing to say.
Why?

Because you are a piss off ; poor analyst
from the longkang of West Jurong , Singapore

>>>>


Very bias of calvin. Thanks for highlighting.

In behavioural finance, this is termed confirmation bias.

>>>
Posted by calvintaneng > 36 minutes ago | Report Abuse

so many palm oil cos gave us double digits dividends

dividends alone already over Rm300,000 to-date😀

>>>>


When you post like this, how to be intelligent in your investing.

>>>
Posted by calvintaneng > 34 minutes ago | Report Abuse

now time to go kai kai 😄
>>>

Probably the best post from you today.

YEAR DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 0 .. 1.94 .. 0.83
2010 0.48 .. 2.9 .. 1.49
2011 1.43 .. 17.42 .. 2.18
2012 3.86 .. 15.7 .. 1.99
2013 1 .. 1.16 .. 2.04
2014 1.5 .. 6.41 .. 2.02
2015 1 .. 3.84 .. 1.33
2016 1.3 .. 6 .. 1.34
2017 0.5 .. 8.57 .. 1.08
2018 0.5 .. -5.15 .. 0.47
2019 0 .. -26.57 .. 1.04
2020 0 .. -6.51 .. 0.9
2021 0 .. 1.06 .. 0.62
2022 2.8 .. 13.83P .. 0.64
2023 3.00E .. 11.00E .. 0.78

DPS, EPS and Year End Price are adjusted for capital changes
Total cumulative EPS 26.77
Total Cumulative DPS 14.37
DPO Ratio 53.7%
SimePlantation


This is among the largest plantation stock in Bursa. Yet, it is so poorly managed. Very sad for Malaysians, that many GLC companies are not well managed.

Philip is an investor that I enjoy studying and learning from.

SSLee is interesting too. He has sacrificed so much for his family and parents. That is most admirable.

Stockraider is a good contributor too. His posts were at times quite thought provoking, with some substance too.

Concentrated portfolio.
Hold for the long term.
Reinvest all dividends.
Let compounding over the long term does its MAGIC.

QMV approach

Q = Quality of company
M = Management Integrity
V = Valuation

Stay with high quality growth company managed by people with high integrity.
Having satisfied the above rule, then look at its valuation.

Always buy at a discount to its calculated intrinsic value. Never over pay to own any stock.

A great company or business can be a very bad investment WHEN YOU PAY TOO HIGH A PRICE TO OWN IT.

YEAR DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 1.25 .. 2.79 .. 0.24
2010 1.88 .. 3.98 .. 0.28
2011 1.5 .. 4.17 .. 0.3
2012 2.25 .. 6.23 .. 0.36
2013 3.25 .. 8.26 .. 0.59
2014 3.25 .. 9.67 .. 0.68
2015 6.75 .. 12.01 .. 1.68
2016 7.5 .. 18.92 .. 1.57
2017 7.88 .. 27.68 .. 2.13
2018 8.25 .. 21.06 .. 1.5
2019 14.38 .. 23.66 .. 2.57
2020 8.1 .. 28.1 .. 2.33
2021 9.3 .. 29.34 .. 1.96
2022 9 .. 17.26 .. 1.84


DPS, EPS and Year End Price are adjusted for capital changes
Total cumulative EPS 213.13
Total Cumulative DPS 84.54
DPO Ratio 39.7%
Magni

My friend, a seasoned investor, recommended this stock many years ago after reading a write up on it in a financial magazine. It is a multi-bagger stock in my portfolio.

YEAR DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 0.86 .. 2.78 .. 0.24
2010 1.33 .. 4.35 .. 0.34
2011 1.82 .. 5.57 .. 0.41
2012 2.16 .. 6.05 .. 0.53
2013 4.15 .. 7.95 .. 0.94
2014 2.82 .. 10.7 .. 1.18
2015 3.65 .. 11.41 .. 1.62
2016 4.15 .. 17.37 .. 2.22
2017 5.31 .. 17.55 .. 2.87
2018 6.63 .. 19.66 .. 2.94
2019 6.63 .. 21.48 .. 3.13
2020 6.63 .. 25.08 .. 4.21
2021 8.31 .. 29.49 .. 4.79
2022 9 .. 26.43 .. 3.22
2023 9.00 .. 27.50 .. 3.65

DPS, EPS and Year End Price are adjusted for capital changes
Total cumulative EPS 205.87
Total Cumulative DPS 63.45
DPO Ratio 30.8%
Scientex

Thanks for sharing the track record of calvin. Very insightful indeed.

>>>
Posted by SEE_Research > 1 minute ago | Report Abuse

FOR HIS SELF DESIGNED K ONCOCTION OF SUPER DUPER BULLS RUN , ONCE IN A CENTURY BUT 33 MONTHS HAD PASSED BY , IN WHICH HE HAD TO ENDURE INSIDE THE LAPSAP LONGKANG ,
>>>>

>>>
SEERESEARCH2023

Yes buy low sell high. Did u enter when he promote gao gao from rm1.7-rm1.0?

26 minutes ago
>>>


I am bemused by calvin's last few posts.

YEAR .. DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 .. 0.16 .. 1.24 .. 0.05
2010 .. 0.16 .. 0.96 .. 0.08
2011 .. 0.16 .. 2.25 .. 0.17
2012 .. 0.25 .. 2.66 .. 0.29
2013 .. 0.25 .. 2.08 .. 0.91
2014 .. 0.53 .. 1.75 .. 1.14
2015 .. 0.64 .. 5.58 .. 1.24
2016 .. 7.05 .. 5.89 .. 1.23
2017 .. 2.55 .. 5.56 .. 1.72
2018 .. 4.25 .. 12.76 .. 1.78
2019 .. 2.55 .. 5.49 .. 2.75
2020 .. 2.55 .. 3.31 .. 2.44
2021 .. 2.55 .. 5.98 .. 2.55
2022 .. 3 .. 10.75 .. 2.43
2023 .. 2.00E .. 17.5 .. 2.53

DPS, EPS and Year End Price are adjusted for capital changes
Total cumulative EPS 66.26
Total Cumulative DPS 26.65
DPO Ratio 40%
Yinson

YEAR .. DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 .. 27.45 .. 27.48 .. 5.52
2010 .. 0 .. 37.38 .. 6.2
2011 .. 27 .. 46.39 .. 6.2
2012 .. 16 .. 44.7 .. 6.4
2013 .. 22 .. 39.33 .. 6.92
2014 .. 20 .. 30.81 .. 5.45
2015 .. 16 .. 34.78 .. 7.27
2016 .. 17 .. 36.65 .. 6.98
2017 .. 24 .. 52.21 .. 7.7
2018 .. 29 .. 61.85 .. 9.29
2019 .. 29 .. 35.14 .. 7.35
2020 .. 12 .. 20.35 .. 7.43
2021 .. 40 .. 91.81 .. 8.92
2022 .. 48 .. 79.03 .. 8.6
2023 .. 24.00E .. 31.00E .. 7.22

DPS, EPS and Year End Price are adjusted for capital changes
Total cumulative EPS 637.91
Total Cumulative DPS 327.45
DPO Ratio 51%
PChem

YEAR .. DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 .. 1.08 .. 4.19 .. 0.6
2010 .. 1.05 .. 5.02 .. 1.08
2011 .. 1.58 .. 5.57 .. 1.15
2012 .. 1.58 .. 5.88 .. 1.15
2013 .. 1.67 .. 5.89 .. 1.51
2014 .. 1.79 .. 6.57 .. 1.69
2015 .. 2.18 .. 7.87 .. 2.2
2016 .. 2.18 .. 7.89 .. 2.24
2017 .. 3.72 .. 8.05 .. 2.9
2018 .. 3 .. 8.47 .. 4.54
2019 .. 3 .. 8.91 .. 5.42
2020 .. 3 .. 9.84 .. 5.8
2021 .. 3.5 .. 12.82 .. 4.57
2022 .. 3.5 .. 8.93 .. 5.51


DPS, EPS and Year End Price are adjusted for capital changes
Total cumulative EPS 105.9
Total Cumulative DPS 32.83
DPO Ratio 31%
QL

In investing, it is important not to follow the herd blindly. Always be independent. Do your own homework.

YEAR DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 2.1 .. 7.13 .. 0.69
2010 3.63 .. 5.22 .. 0.87
2011 4.29 .. 6.29 .. 0.77
2012 4.95 .. 10.39 .. 0.75
2013 3.96 .. 6.2 .. 0.84
2014 4.95 .. 6.71 .. 0.88
2015 7.59 .. 8.13 .. 1
2016 4.95 .. 7.96 .. 1.14
2017 7.26 .. 7.53 .. 1.41
2018 4.98 .. 10.31 .. 1.18
2019 6 .. 5.73 .. 1.6
2020 4 .. 4.31 .. 1.6
2021 8 .. 10.16 .. 1.66
2022 11 .. 13.87 .. 1.86
2023 14.00E .. 16.00E .. 1.82

DPS, EPS and Year End Price are adjusted for capital changes
Total cumulative EPS 109.94
Total Cumulative DPS 77.66
DPO Ratio 70.6%
Kim Loong


YEAR .. DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 .. 18.75 .. 64.44 .. 6.82
2010 .. 31.88 .. 66.61 .. 8.55
2011 .. 35.63 .. 91.08 .. 9.5
2012 .. 45 .. 88.62 .. 12.5
2013 .. 46.94 .. 70.48 .. 13
2014 .. 84.38 .. 64.95 .. 12.2
2015 .. 45 .. 70.57 .. 12.68
2016 .. 50 .. 74.36 .. 13.46
2017 .. 57.5 .. 93.63 .. 14.04
2018 .. 75 .. 92.28 .. 12.75
2019 .. 75 .. 67.08 .. 13.14
2020 .. 72.5 .. 91.08 .. 14.52
2021 .. 95 .. 126.04 .. 13.88
2022 .. 125 .. 146.04 .. 15.3
2023 .. 140.00E .. 125.00E .. 16

DPS, EPS and Year End Price are adjusted for capital changes
Total cumulative EPS 1207.26
Total Cumulative DPS 857.58
DPO Ratio 71.0%
United Plantation


These 2 plantation businesses are well run.

YEAR …. ADJ DPS(SEN) …. ADJ EPS(SEN) …. ADJ YEPX
2009 …. 0.4 …. 4.4 …. 0.44
2010 …. 1.08 …. 5.45 …. 0.46
2011 …. 0.93 …. 3.71 …. 0.45
2012 …. 0.87 …. 4.4 …. 0.45
2013 …. 1.17 …. 4.07 …. 0.65
2014 …. 1.17 …. 3.19 …. 0.39
2015 …. 1.17 …. CFY …. 0.76
2016 …. 1.4 …. 4.27 …. 0.49
2017 …. 1.28 …. 1.87 …. 0.47
2018 …. 1.86 …. 4.74 …. 0.81
2019 …. 0.71 …. 4.59 …. 0.66
2020 …. 0 …. 18.01 …. 5.82
2021 …. 30.77 …. 139.4 …. 1.47
2022 …. 8 …. 25.99 …. 0.87
2023 …. 6.50E …. (6.40)P …. 0.81


Total cumulative EPS 224.09
Total Cumulative DPS 50.81
DPO Ratio 22.7%
Supermax

YEAR …. ADJ DPS(SEN) …. ADJ EPS(SEN) …. ADJ YEPX
2009 …. 0.92 …. 2.37 …. 0.42
2010 …. 1.33 …. 3.53 …. 0.42
2011 …. 0.92 …. 1.62 …. 0.42
2012 …. 1.33 …. 2.81 …. 0.47
2013 …. 1.33 …. 2.46 …. 0.47
2014 …. 1.33 …. 2.3 …. 0.38
2015 …. 1.92 …. 3.79 …. 1.13
2016 …. 2.42 …. 4.62 …. 0.89
2017 …. 2.42 …. 4.36 …. 1.33
2018 …. 2.58 …. 5.68 …. 1.87
2019 …. 4.17 …. 4.76 …. 1.57
2020 …. 11.83 …. 21.56 …. 6.12
2021 …. 65.1 …. 98.27 …. 2.59
2022 …. 1.2 …. 2.12 …. 0.91
2023 …. 0.00E …. (6.50)E …. 0.82


Total cumulative EPS 160.25
Total Cumulative DPS 98.8
DPO Ratio 61.7%
Topglove

YEAR DPS(SEN) .. EPS(SEN) .. YEPX
2009 0.32 .. 2.55 .. 0.34
2010 0.56 .. 4.43 .. 0.4
2011 1.38 .. 3.51 .. 0.41
2012 1.13 .. 3.99 .. 0.42
2013 1.75 .. 5.61 .. 1.08
2014 1.75 .. 5.6 .. 1.12
2015 2.5 .. 7.72 .. 2.33
2016 2.88 .. 6.71 .. 1.65
2017 2.75 .. 6.86 .. 2.03
2018 1.5 .. 7.83 .. 2.17
2019 3 .. 8.86 .. 2.08
2020 6 .. 42.12 .. 4.5
2021 47 .. 113.83 .. 1.92
2022 12 .. 5.61 .. 1.1
2023 2.50E .. 0.50E .. 1.36

DPS, EPS and Year End Price are adjusted for capital changes
Total cumulative EPS 225.23
Total Cumulative DPS 84.52
DPO Ratio 37.5%
Kossan