7. Seventh is complexity.
Some value investors prefer simple setups. They like common stock in straightforward companies. I do, as the model makes clear. But others like it complicated. They may seek convertible bonds that become equity only under hard-to-forecast circumstances. They may prefer stock in development-stage pharmaceutical companies undergoing clinical trials, or in technology companies whose fortunes are dependent on the outcome of pioneering research.

They adore these complications not because they’re falling prey to the cleverness bias. They adore them because it gives them less buy-side competition. Other investors will simply abstain from trying to sort out convoluted situations. This can keep prices lower than they would be otherwise.


8. Eighth is shorting.
Shorting is a way to bet on a stock price’s decline. It involves selling stock without actually owning it, by renting it from someone who does, with the goal of profiting when the price falls.

Shorting is theoretically attractive. It promises a way to benefit from a finding that a security is overpriced. But it’s thorny to implement. Shares to rent can be hard to find, fees can be high, and a short squeeze can cause a price meant to plunge to actually soar.

Despite these complications, some value investors do short. But many do so as agents, not as principals. That’s because it increases their compensation. Shorting is a hallmark of a complicated fund. It’s the kind of stunt that managers attempt in order to justify compensation schemes of 2 percent plus 20 percent. It’s a ticket out of the land of 1 percent.

5. A fifth valid difference is quality.
Our approach has been to focus on how good a business is in an absolute sense, before considering price. We labor over historic performance metrics, strategic positioning, and shareholder-friendliness. We look for quality.

But an equally convinced group focuses on buying companies that are inexpensive relative to how good they are. To them garbage is fine, as long as it’s cheap garbage. Some in this group get exceptional results.

My focus on company quality reflects three of my other preferences: inactivism, concentration, and a long holding period. What I buy has to be good because I’m not going to fix it, I’ve only got a few others like it, and it’s mine forever.

These preferences aren’t about great foresight or morality. They’re about taxes. Unrealized appreciation isn’t taxed in the United States, so everything else being equal, holding is advantageous. I draw a straight line from tax policy to investment policy.


6. Sixth is leverage.
Leverage is debt. What is true for operating companies is true for investors: debt amplifies results. When an investor buys on margin, results that would otherwise be good become exceptional, and results that would otherwise be bad become catastrophic. The potential of the latter keeps many value investors away from debt. But not all.

3. A third valid difference is activism.
Activist investors agitate for change in the companies that they own. They might be viewed as their own catalysts. The alternative is staying uninvolved. It’s the choice of most investors, both good and bad. I call it inactivism, since passive implies index fund investing.

Activism requires an extraordinary level of gravitas and tenacity. People who are feared and skilled in this specialty are the ones that achieve the best results. Activism is not something in which one fruitfully dabbles.


4. Fourth is diversification.
Some value investors have diversified portfolios, with perhaps 50 or more names. Others prefer concentration, with fewer than 10.

These thresholds depend somewhat on the amount of money managed. A $50,000 portfolio spread out among a dozen different stocks might be considered diversified, while a $10 billion fund invested in a dozen names might seem concentrated.

Diversification tends to decrease volatility, should that be a goal. But, the more diversified a portfolio is, the harder it is to beat a relevant index.

One way to appreciate this is through the law of large numbers. It’s a principle from probability. It says that the more times an experiment is run, the closer the average result will be to the expected result. In investing, the expected result is the index’s return. So the more names in the portfolio—each name being an experiment, in the parlance of the law—the closer the portfolio’s return will
be to that of the index.

Some stripes of value investing force one into a diversified portfolio. Small cap investing can, since there aren’t that many shares traded of each company. They’re small. So a small-cap investor that adds $100,000 to assets under management might have to find a new name because the ones already owned don’t have enough shares available to buy.

1. First is asset class.
Listed equities return best over time, as addressed. But there are practitioners able to squeeze performance out of other sorts of holdings. Bonds work for some, real estate works for others. They’re tougher rows to hoe, but some hoe them well.

2. A second valid difference is holding period.
Some value investors plan to hold what they buy for just months. Others hope to hold indefinitely. Different timelines occasion different priorities. For example, short-term holders consider catalysts. A catalyst is a reason that a price could soar from the depressed level that helped to make a security attractive. Unexpectedly good quarterly results could be a catalyst, as could the dismissal of an unpopular executive.

Catalysts are less interesting to long-term investors. They’re too near-term a concern. Never intending to sell, I don’t give them a thought.

Differences between Value Investors

The distinction between price and value is the sole requisite principle of value investing. It’s the only must. Beyond that, there are valid differences in approach. I see eight.


Summary

Dimensions on which bona fide value investors can differ include:

1. Asset class

2. Holding period

3. Activism

4. Diversification

5. Quality

6. Leverage

7. Complexity

8. Shorting

TSH Resources

Year Price range (LPr - HPr) adjusted for capital changes RM
2002 0.16 - 0.26
2007 0.51 - 1.10
2012 1.25 - 1.91
2017 1.56 - 1.94
2022 0.90 - 1.89
2023 0.99 - 1.15


Year Dividends per Share (sens)
2002 0.27
2003 0.53
2004 0.53
2005 1.67
2006 1.67
2007 1.67
2008 2.20
2009 1.67
2010 1.67
2011 2.00
2012 2.33
2013 1.67
2014 2.33
2015 2.50
2016 2.00
2017 2.00
2018 2.00
2019 1.00
2020 1.00
2021 1.50
2022 11.00

Total Dividends per share paid out from 2002 to 2022 = 43.21 sen

Dutch Lady

Year Price range (LPr - HPr)
2002 3.85 - 8.35
2007 10.00 - 13.30
2012 23.40 - 37.80
2017 54.00 - 62.00
2022 30.00 - 34.60
2023 25.80 - 30.30

Year Dividends (sens)
2002 5.8
2003 12.8
2004 56
2005 63.2
2006 63.2
2007 63.2
2008 42.1
2009 65.6
2010 72.5
2011 72.5
2012 260
2013 260
2014 220
2015 220
2016 220
2017 280
2018 200
2019 100
2020 80
2021 50
2022 50

Total Dividends paid out from 2002 to 2022 = 2456.9 sen = RM 24.569

Dutch Lady

Year Price range (LPr - HPr)
2002 3.85 - 8.35
2007 10.00 - 13.30
2012 23.40 - 37.80
2017 54.00 - 62.00
2022 30.00 - 34.60
2023 25.80 - 30.30

Year Dividends (sens)
2002 5.8
2003 12.8
2004 56
2005 63.2
2006 63.2
2007 63.2
2008 42.1
2009 65.6
2010 72.5
2011 72.5
2012 260
2013 260
2014 220
2015 220
2016 220
2017 280
2018 200
2019 100
2020 80
2021 50
2022 50

Total Dividends paid out from 2002 to 2022 = 2456.9 sen = RM 24.569

Why did I invest in iCAP in 2005?

Essentially for long term capital gains.
Time horizon was 15 years.
Hoping for a CAGR in its NAV of 15% per year. :-)

Alas, have to settle for a lower returns. But for those who has to cash out now or soon, very sad for them as they will be leaving a lot of cash behind.

Basically, I avoid REITS in general. The main reason is its limited upside compared to good quality growth stocks.

Risks

We believe the biggest risk to investing in REITs today is the impact from an economic recession. As a result of the recession, rents and occupancy levels in commercial real estate fall, resulting in a decline in property values.

In addition, if interest rates rise and REIT dividend yields move back toward their historical averages, REIT share prices could also decline.

Other risks to investing in REITs include a considerable increase in the amount of new construction (which would reverse the favourable demand-supply characteristics of the current market) and the potential for large common stock issuances.

We note that because of their high payout requirement, REITs generally need to raise capital in order to finance their growth plans. These capital raises can impact the common share price of the REIT.

What are the Risks of Investing in Real Estate Investment Trusts?

Of course, nothing in this life is guaranteed, and that includes real estate investment trusts.

REITs are more than just a pile of properties, they are active businesses, and subject to business risks. It's a testimony to the industry, however, that over the years only a handful have gotten into deep financial trouble.

According to Ralph L. Block in Investing in REITs, those real estate trusts that have gotten into trouble have done so primarily due to:
- excessive debt leverage,
- poor allocation of capital resources, and
- questionable transactions with directors or major stockholders.

That's for individual REITs.

As an industry, their businesses are subject to two particular risks no matter how well managed they are (though good management can succeed despite these dangers).

1. Overbuilding or excess capacity, or overdevelopment.
2. High interest rates

REITs are real estate companies that must pay out high dividends in order to enjoy the tax benefits of REIT status. Stable income that can exceed Treasury yields combines with price volatility to offer a total return potential that rivals small capitalization stocks. Analyzing an REIT requires understanding the accounting distortions caused by depreciation and paying careful attention to macroeconomic influences.

At the individual REIT level, you want to see strong prospects for growth in revenue, such as rental income, related service income and FFO (funds from operations). You want to see if the REIT has a unique strategy for improving occupancy and raising its rents. REITs typically seek growth through acquisitions, and further aim to realize economies of scale by assimilating inefficiently run properties. Economies of scale would be realized by a reduction in operating expenses as a percentage of revenue. But acquisitions are a double-edged sword. If an REIT cannot improve occupancy rates and/or raise rents, it may be forced into ill-considered acquisitions in order to fuel growth.

PAVREIT
5YR CAP APP (3.09) (%)... DY 4.52(%)
10YR CAP APP (0.79) (%)... DY 4.83 (%)

AXREIT
5YR CAP APP 5.83 (%)... DY 4.92 (%)
10YR CAP APP 0.51 (%)... DY 5.18 (%)

YTLREIT
5YR CAP APP (3.93) (%)... DY 4.90 (%)
10YR CAP APP (1.20) (%)... DY 6.15 (%)

UOAREIT
5YR CAP APP(2.91) (%)... DY 7.50 (%)
10YR CAP APP (2.46) (%)... DY 6.96 (%)

ALAQAR REIT
5YR CAP APP 0.56 (%)... DY 5.96 (%)
10YR CAP APP 0.57 (%)... DY 5.73 (%)

SENTRAL REIT
5YR CAP APP (4.78) (%)... DY 7.80 (%)
10YR CAP APP (2.90) (%)... DY 7.49 (%)

ARREIT
5YR CAP APP (7,47) (%)... DY 7.36 (%)
10YR CAP APP (5.08) (%)... DY 7.17 (%)

SUNREIT
5YR CAP APP (0.88) (%)... DY 4.31 (%)
10YR CAP APP 0.63 (%)... DY 4.99 (%)

P/B

SAB 0.67
AEONCR 1.52
AJINOMOTO 1.75
ALLIANCE BANK 0.80
APEX HEALTH 3.36

Price RM 3.58

L5Yr CAGR Cap App (1.85) DY 1.35
L10Yr CAGR Cap App 3.42 DY 1.29

EPS sen
2009 9.47
2014 28.06
2019 15.69
2021 27.28

http://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2023/05/coastal-is-one-of-leading-shipbuilders.html

Warren Buffett: Earnings and not book value are what determine the value of a business.






@5.45

Earnings are what determine value and not book value. Book value is not a factor we consider. Future earnings are a factor we consider.

Earnings have been poor for many great Japanese companies. If you think the return on equity of the Japanese companies is going to increase dramatically, then you are going to make a lot of money in Japanese stocks. But the returns on equity of Japanese businesses have been quite low, and that makes a low price to book ratio very appropriate because earnings are measured against books.

A company earning 5% on book value, I do not want to buy it at book value, if I think it is going to keep earning 5% on book value. A low price to book ratio means nothing to us. It does not intrigue us. In fact, if anything, we are less likely to look at something that sells at a lower value in relation to book than something that sells at a higher relation to book. The chances are we are looking at a poor business in the first case and a good business in the second case.

https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2023/05/warren-buffett-earnings-and-not-book.html

>>>>
Stock: [INSAS]: INSAS BHD

1 month ago | Report Abuse

And here is another sad truth that all new investors need to learn.

29. Lee Soon Sheng 2,515,000 0.38%

Sslee is stuck. No one is willing to offer more for his shares. And worse, liquidity for insas is so bad that if he were to try to sell his entire position, he would have to ask a substantially lower price below quote, take a huge loss as he paid much higher for his shares, and worse he would have to sell over a longer period of time due to being a illiquid market.

So again, why would you want to buy insas when you can get the liquidity and demand by buying inari shares?

>>>>


Now I have a bit of understanding on how SSLee behaves in Insas.

Well, I have invested in severely undervalued stocks (with good balance sheet) before.

In one instance, the insider was buying and buying all the time, and the price continued to remain low. It was obviously undervalued but the price just did not change at all. After a few years, the inevitable bear market arrived, the share price tanked with the whole market. Then the bear market was over, the share price returned back to the previous low price. And all these times, the insider was buying in meaningful quantities regularly. It was another 2 or 3 years later, the price of the stock crept up gradually and this too coincided with the insider having stopped buying more into its shares. As the price went up, "dumb" investors came into the stock and at a certain high price, the insider started his selling.

Another severely undervalued counter I had was based on an asset play. The company was by my assessment undervalued. Its business wasn't great, just good. It paid regular dividends giving a yield higher than the risk free interest rate of FD every year. You can think of it as an arbitrage :-) , instead of putting in FD, put into this stock and get a yield just above the FD rate. While waiting, you know the prime land in its portfolio was appreciating all the time. The insiders did nothing, just running the everyday business, without any urgency to realise the full value of the stock. This continued for years and into a decade or so. Finally, a day arrived. The major shareholder (insider) made an offer to take the share private, paying a premium of about 80% above the market price. Of course, as usual,, the insider got the company private at a discount even at this price.

What lessons can we learn from these 2 examples? A deep value investor need to understand the business very well, just like every other investors. Why is the company undervalued? How will this undervaluation gap be narrowed? Unfortunately, as a small investor, and in these smaller companies, your investing into such companies are tied to the actions of the insiders who are the majority sharehoders. You will need a lot of PATIENCE, PATIENCE, PATIENCE ...
In the above 2 examples, the catalysts were different. The significant players often can determine the price too set at the end of the day.

As for the returns, it depend on how soon the undervalued stock realises its fair value. Sometimes, the undervalued stock can remain undervalued for a very very long time; long enough for some of its investors to be insolvent. :-)

This person has selective memory. Too intelligent but lacking a bit in integrity. Malaysians are not going to get a good deal with this person. At this advance age, he should gracefully let others with a longer time horizon carry their agenda to govern and develop Malaysia to the next stage. He had his chances, and rightfully, he knew he underachieved, perhaps, through no fault of others. He blew it.

For those who are imvested in YTL Power, their returns over the last 5 and 10 years were as below:

5 years compounded annual return: capital appreciation (0.72%) and dividend yields 4.88%
10 years compounded annual return: capital appreciation (4.47%) and dividend yields 5.23%

>>>>
Posted by OTB > 5 minutes ago | Report Abuse

Do not put words in my mouth.
I am very sure I will never reply in this manner.
I know what is manner and customer is always right.
Show me the proof loh !!
No proof, nothing to talk further.

>>>>

Just take this as the truth. It is hidden in one of the past posts.

OTB

I am polite and direct. Of course, it is true. Why should I post something that is not true?

I joined i3 much later than most. At that time, I gathered you were the top performer in the stock selection contest. There was a lot of discussion between you and Chong, whom you subscribed to his fundamental analysis online course, which you enjoyed. There were a lot of talk about you having people who paid a fees to follow your calls. I was curious and wished to find out more. I posted and that was the reply.

Never mind. I was just curious what you were offering.

In my very early years in i3, I was curious about OTB. Curious enough to send a post to enquire about the service he was offering. His reply was direct: "Just join."

Needless to say, with such a reply, I did not pursue the matter further. I don't think I miss anything.

Despite its recent very poor earnings due to Covid and the aftermath of this, the DPS in 2022 was a generous 15 sen per share. This DPS is expected to be repeated in 2023. Its present price is well supported by the dividends, which at the present price of RM 2.72 per share, translate intoa dividend yield of 5.54%. With the opening up of the economy and travelling, and particularly with more travellers from local and abroad, recovery of its earnings to its previous years is expected.

Its share price:
in 2009 RM 5.10 - RM 7.68
in 2023 RM 24.50 - RM 30.00

Its EPS:
In 2019 47 sen
In 2023 140 sen

Its DPS:
In 2009 41 sen
In 2023 140 sen

It is presently trading at RM 28.20 per share at a fair PE of 20.29.

Is it not true that the investor who makes the most money is the one who got into a stock with good economic moat (duopoly, brand) early in its business life cycle and who has the conviction to sit still.

By definition, this company is a slow grower in Lynch classification of businesses. You get a DY of about 4% and very gradual slow capital appreciation in its share price.

Growth in earnings has flattened the last 3 years. Its PE too is rather too high.

We can expect the management to pay a dividend too for this year.

Q1 2022 EPS 26.77 sen
Q2 2022 EPS 26.37 sen
1H 2022 EPS 53.14 sen
Projected EPS for year 2022 = 53.14 x 2 = 106 sen

This company has turned around convincingly by entering into new businesses in Brazil.

Given its very high earnings the last 2 quarters and this is probably sustainable, at RM 2.28 per share the company is available at a very good price indeed.

Having the right temperament is so important. It is obvious now that NETX at 1 sen per share in 2019 when promoted in this forum was a very expensive stock indeed. Hope you did not find out through directly participating in it, like a Singaporean who sold many of his houses to own this “very cheap stock.”

Summary:

“A 1 sen stock can be the most expensive and a RM 100 stock can be undervalued.”

Harta gave dividends as followed:
2021 82.30 sen per share
2022 21.80 sen per share.
This add up to a dividend of 104 sen per share for the 2 years.

Share prices of Harta (RM)
2017 2.27 - 5.70
2018 5.17 - 7.45
2019 4.52 - 6.18
2020 5.32 - 21.16
2021 4.95 - 13.44
2022 1.46 - 6.10
2023 1.41 - 2.33

Today, Harta trades at RM 2.23 per share and faces a struggle in its business in the next 2 or more years.

Topglove distributed 11.83 sen dividends per share in 2020 and 65.10 sen dividends per share in 2021. This add up to a dividend of 77 sen per share for the 2 years.

Share prices of Topglove (RM)
2017 0.76 - 1.37
2018 1.31 - 2.21
2019 1.40 - 1.89
2020 1.52 - 9.77
2021 1.98 - 7.12
2022 0.57 - 2.53
2023 0.66 - 1.18

Today, Topglove trades at RM 1.09 and faces a struggle in its business in the next 2 or more years.

Its latest EPS is reaching those of its historical highest EPS. Latest dividend of 12.50 sen per share is encouraging. It is trading at fair PE of 17 and DY 3.17%.

Hard asset company. Refineries require lots of capital. Refining margins can fluctuate a lot too. Gruesome business to be in, I think.

When earnings are not predictable, it will be impossible to value the stock. Too hard to value company. Move on.

I used to own Shell and was glad to cash out at $12.00 per shares many years ago.

The CPO price is cyclical. It peaked in 2022.

In 2010, its EPS was 63.50 sen. In 2021, its EPS was 137.09 sen. It has grown its earnings at a faster rate than PBB during the same period.
Today, it too is trading at the low of its historical PE range. DY 3%.

Historically it has grown its EPS from 21.41 sen in 2012 to 31.50 sen in 2022.
At 3.98 per share, PBB is trading at a low of its historical PE range.

... and at a DY of 3.03%.

Most of the revenues and profits of PPB are derived from its grain and agribusiness of its associate, Wilmar.

The 5 Yr average EPS of PPB has grown from 56.83 sen in 2009 to 102.39 sen in 2022. It is trading today at an undemanding PE.

At present price of 16.24 per share, it is trading at an undemanding historical PE.

Jtiasa's business is very cyclical. To profit from this stock, you will need to know when to buy in and when to get out. Unless you have the special skill to do so, look for another stock to invest into.

2022 FYE DPS 2.50 EPS 12.69 sen PE 6.46

The company is not growing its earnings consistently. The earnings fluctuate up and down and over the last 10 years or so, its EPS has ranged from low of 9.34 sen to 13.01 sen . Its PE ranges from 4.71 to 6.83. It is trading today at 84 sen, at PE of 6.46 and DY of about 3%.

Not easy to value this company.

Having the right temperament is so important. It is obvious now that NETX at 1 sen per share in 2019 when promoted in this forum was a very expensive stock indeed. Hope you did not find out through directly participating in it, like a Singaporean who sold many of his houses to own this “very cheap stock.”

Summary:

“A 1 sen stock can be the most expensive and a RM 100 stock can be undervalued.” It is very important to have a check list in your investing. I have one which I use repeatedly. Quality and Management FIRST, then Valuation. Know the company you wish to put your money into very well. Then, you must have a simple way to determine its intrinsic value. Always buy with a MARGIN OF SAFETY to this intrinsic value.

Keep your investing simple and safe.

A game you will wish to be involve using a simple rule.

You can make a lot of money from the foolishness of fellow players in the market.

To buy from them when they panic and sell their stocks at undervalued prices. To sell to them when they are exuberant to own stocks at overvalued prices.

No banks can withstand a run by the depositors.The smaller banks in US are perceived vulnerable to this behaviour of their depositors. The FDIC guarantees up to US 250,000 per name and does not protect ALL depositors leaving some fearful.

A not unthinkable solution is a regulation to prevent access of the depositors to their money for a period until fear subsides.

Charlie Munger was incapable of looking at a business without thinking the economic fundamentals of it.

Quoting Warren Buffett

The following "how" questions can guide the appraisal of business returns.

How much?
How soon?
How long?
How consistent?
How valuable?

When a speaker focuses on these economic fundamentals of a business, the talk is more educational and the approach to investing is safer.

The following "how" questions can guide the appraisal of business returns.

How much?
How soon?
How long?
How consistent?
How valuable?

When a speaker focuses on these economic fundamentals of a business, the talk is more educational and the approach to investing is safer.

Plantation Stocks

Company … Market Cap … Last Price … PE … DY … ROE
AASIA (7054)MAIN … 72.60m … 0.11 … - … 0 … -2.16
BKAWAN (1899)MAIN … 8.694b … 21.76 … 8.06 … 5.06 … 14.32
BLDPLNT (5069)MAIN … 964.92m … 10.32 … 38.28 … 0.48 … 3.49
BPLANT (5254)MAIN … 1.602b … 0.72 … 2.69 … 20.21 … 19.98
CEPAT (8982)MAIN … 211.77m … 0.67 … 6.71 … 6.02 … 7.74
CHINTEK (1929)MAIN … 743.70m … 8.14 … 9.06 … 5.16 … 9.86
DSR (03055)LEAP … 284.77m … 0.91 … - … 0 … -
DUTALND (3948)MAIN … 241.14m … 0.29 … - … 3.51 … -3.14
FAREAST (5029)MAIN … 2.286b … 3.85 … 10.52 … 4.68 … 15.31
FGV (5222)MAIN … 5.290b … 1.45 … 4 … 10.34 … 21.2
GENP (2291)MAIN … 5.357b … 5.97 … 11.36 … 5.7 … 9.04
GLBHD (7382)MAIN … 57.96m … 0.26 … - … 0 … -12.92
GOPENG (2135)MAIN … 153.33m … 0.38 … - … 2.63 … -1.38
HARNLEN (7501)MAIN … 403.67m … 0.73 … - … 0 … -
HSPLANT (5138)MAIN … 1.456b … 1.82 … 6.92 … 6.59 … 10.91
INCKEN (2607)MAIN … 176.72m … 0.42 … - … 0 … -1.61
INNO (6262)MAIN … 622.52m … 1.3 … 7.32 … 14.23 … 28.21
IOICORP (1961)MAIN … 24.009b … 3.82 … 13.1 … 3.66 … 16.11
JTIASA (4383)MAIN … 652.39m … 0.67 … 4.55 … 4.18 … 10.76
KLK (2445)MAIN … 23.480b … 21.72 … 11.68 … 4.6 … 14.72
KLUANG (2453)MAIN … 243.21m … 3.85 … - … 0.7 … -0.95
KMLOONG (5027)MAIN … 1.783b … 1.84 … 10.97 … 8.15 … 19.51
KRETAM (1996)MAIN … 1.455b … 0.63 … 13.21 … 1.6 … 13.48
MALPAC (4936)MAIN … 60.00m … 0.8 … 20.83 … 0 … 1.66
MATANG (0189)ACE … 215.03m … 0.09 … 39.13 … 2.44 … 2.09
MHC (5026)MAIN … 175.91m … 0.9 … 5.08 … 7.82 … 11.22
NPC (5047)MAIN … 216.00m … 1.8 … - … 0 … -0.31
NSOP (2038)MAIN … 238.69m … 3.4 … 8.62 … 4.12 … 4.75
PINEPAC (1902)MAIN … 52.43m … 0.35 … - … 8.57 … -5.4
PLS (9695)MAIN … 373.68m … 0.85 … 24.01 … 0 … 5.1
RSAWIT (5113)MAIN … 285.84m … 0.14 … - … 0 … -0.12
RVIEW (2542)MAIN … 220.49m … 3.4 … 15.66 … 11.76 … 3.84
SBAGAN (2569)MAIN … 214.25m … 3.23 … - … 2.17 … -2.65
SHCHAN (4316)MAIN … 90.79m … 0.31 … 6.07 … 0 … 5.74
SIMEPLT (5285)MAIN … 30.291b … 4.38 … 12.17 … 3.66 … 15.18
SOP (5126)MAIN … 2.208b … 2.48 … 4.6 … 4.03 … 14.59
SWKPLNT (5135)MAIN … 596.40m … 2.13 … 6.17 … 9.39 … 13.55
TAANN (5012)MAIN … 1.459b … 3.28 … 4.63 … 12.2 … 17.97
TDM (2054)MAIN … 301.50m … 0.18 … - … 3.66 … -3.61
THPLANT (5112)MAIN … 464.02m … 0.53 … 6.75 … 5.71 … 9.85
TSH (9059)MAIN … 1.396b … 1.01 … 3.01 … 10.4 … 24.31
UMCCA (2593)MAIN … 1.112b … 5.3 … 15.56 … 2.83 … 5.05
UTDPLT (2089)MAIN … 6.660b … 16 … - … 8.75 …