Asia88, you should email media@berjaya.com.my if you haven't received it. the door gift is only RM 80, I was mistaken by stockraider and assumed it's RM 150 when the newspaper said it's RM 80.
Why BJCORP is not a business in secular decline... and how past performance is not indicative of future results
Aaron Pek Jan 2 Happy New Year! This is the 3rd part of a 4-part series to BJCORP Part 3 - which I’ve made free as my New Year’s present to all of you! Click these links to read Part 3a and Part 3b. Use Google to search for article by Aaron Pek....
EQUITY ✨ BJCORP Accounting Deep-Dive - Part 3c: Cash Flow Statement Why BJCORP is not a business in secular decline... and how past performance is not indicative of future results
Aaron Pek Jan 2 2 Happy New Year! This is the 3rd part of a 4-part series to BJCORP Part 3 - which I’ve made free as my New Year’s present to all of you! Click these links to read Part 3a and Part 3b.
Click here to read in browser - emails may not reflect any subsequent editing! Cash Flow - Definition, Examples, Types of Cash Flows Summary of this BJCORP Part 3c report (9,000 words): Operating Cash Flows
BJCORP’s OCF has always been positive; however FCF has been consistently negative for most of the past decade. The main reason for their consistently negative FCFs can be traced back to poor profit margins - whether due to disappointing top-line performance or poor operating cost control. Fortunately, this is a turnaround thesis - hence their past performance isn’t necessarily indicative of future performance.
Their Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) has actually been consistently healthy, largely owing to an above-average levels of Payable Days - which themselves were likely contributed by their BJTOTO and BJFOOD subsidiaries.
Their Cash Conversion Ratio is very volatile - however, this can be mainly attributed to their historical Net Profits being volatile (due to recurring Impairments and Gain on disposals), rather than a deviation between OCF and NP trends.
BJCORP has not been paying dividends to its own shareholders for the past half-decade; most of its Dividends paid occurred at the Non-controlling interest level (i.e. dividends paid by their subsidiaries to their shareholders).
Growth CAPEX / Total CAPEX was fairly unsurprising - however, we saw several negative instances of this metric, which implies that they hadn’t reinvested enough maintenance CAPEX to sufficiently maintain the business’s productive capacity in those years.
Most of their material Disposal of operating assets and CAPEX activity over the past decade were related to the corporate exercises that we saw in Part 3b - and are nothing to worry about.
There is one quirky line item called Proceeds from settlement of surrendering certain assets and lease interests to related authorities, amounting to RM 218 mil in FY17. These related to some sort of mysterious corporate development called the “Amat Muhibah Tax Dispute” - luckily, the amounts involved are immaterial.
Financing Cash Flows
BJCORP has been consistently repaying large amounts of debt since 2016 - with average Net debt repayments of RM 500 mil per annum over the past 5 years. This amounts to a staggering debt redemption of 8% of Total Debt (or 5% of Total Equity) per year on average.
This observation allows us guess at what management’s objectives might have been over the past half-decade - which pulls together everything we’ve learned so far from their historical P&L, B/S and CFS of the past 5 years.
The natural inference that we could draw from these observations is that BJCORP’s management (prior to their new CEO’s entrance this year) had been mainly prioritizing debt repayment over the past half-decade - which appears to have involved downsizing, rather than trying to grow the business.
This might explain why BJCORP’s operational performance over that period was so middling - and perhaps more importantly, implies that their poor historical performance was due to an active choice by management to downsize and reduce debt; rather than due to the business being in uncontrollable secular decline.
If so, it could also provide their new CEO with an easy lever to pull in order to quickly reverse their consistently negative Net Profit performance over the psat half-decade - by simply implementing a reallocation of priorities at the conglomerate, both in terms of setting incentives (i.e. KPIs) as well as optimal capital allocation (which we’ve explored in Part 1).
Next week, we will at long last be wrapping up this month-long deep-dive analysis of BJCORP in Part 4 - and finally explore how BJCORP might be able to achieve their much-vaunted post-turnaround 3,000% upside.
In Part 1 of my BJCORP equity research report (10,000 words), I mentioned how this stock was my favorite ASEAN stock right now - having a base-case scenario with 300% upside, very little downside risk, and built-in optionality for a potential blue-sky scenario with up to 3,000% upside.
Over the past week, I’ve done a deep-dive into both BJCORP’s historical P&L Statements and Balance Sheets over the past 10 years, which you can view by reading Part 3a (4,000 words) and Part 3b (7,000 words) respectively:
kahhoeng Asia88, you should email media@berjaya.com.my if you haven't received it. the door gift is only RM 80, I was mistaken by stockraider and assumed it's RM 150 when the newspaper said it's RM 80.
Summary With that, we’ve finally brought this bottomless pit of BJCORP’s three statement analysis over the past 10 years to a close. Let’s summarize everything we’ve learned so far in this Part 3c report:
Operating Cash Flows
BJCORP’s OCF has always been positive; however FCF has been consistently negative for most of the past decade. The main reason for their consistently negative FCFs can be traced back to poor profit margins - whether due to disappointing top-line performance or poor operating cost control. Fortunately, this is a turnaround thesis - hence their past performance isn’t necessarily indicative of future performance.
Their Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) has actually been consistently healthy, largely owing to an above-average levels of Payable Days - which themselves were likely contributed by their BJTOTO and BJFOOD subsidiaries.
Their Cash Conversion Ratio is very volatile - however, this can be mainly attributed to their historical Net Profits being volatile (due to recurring Impairments and Gain on disposals), rather than a deviation between OCF and NP trends.
Investing Cash Flows
Growth CAPEX / Total CAPEX was fairly unsurprising - however, we saw several negative instances of this metric, which implies that they hadn’t reinvested enough maintenance CAPEX to sufficiently maintain the business’s productive capacity in those years.
Most of their material Disposal of operating assets and CAPEX activity over the past decade were related to the corporate exercises that we saw in Part 3b - and are nothing to worry about.
There is one quirky line item called Proceeds from settlement of surrendering certain assets and lease interests to related authorities, amounting to RM 218 mil in FY17. These related to some sort of mysterious corporate development called the “Amat Muhibah Tax Dispute” - luckily, the amounts involved are immaterial.
Financing Cash Flows
BJCORP has been consistently repaying large amounts of debt since 2016 - with average Net debt repayments of RM 500 mil per annum over the past 5 years. This amounts to a staggering debt redemption of 8% of Total Debt (or 5% of Total Equity) per year on average.
This observation allows us guess at what management’s objectives might have been over the past half-decade - which pulls together everything we’ve learned so far from their historical P&L, B/S and CFS of the past 5 years, namely:
high levels of Impairments of Goodwill and Gains on Disposals on subsidiary and associate companies since 2015;
consistently large amounts of Assets of disposal group/Non-current assets classified as held for sale since 2015;
the occasional lack of reinvestment to maintain productive capacity (i.e. Growth CAPEX as % of Total CAPEX);
no Dividends paid to its own shareholders since 2017.
The natural inference that we could draw from these observations is that BJCORP’s management (prior to their new CEO’s entrance this year) had been mainly prioritizing debt repayment over the past half-decade - which appears to have involved downsizing, rather than trying to grow the business.
This might explain why BJCORP’s operational performance over that period was so middling - and perhaps more importantly, implies that their poor historical performance was due to an active choice by management to downsize and reduce debt; rather than due to the business being in uncontrollable secular decline.
If so, it could also provide their new CEO with an easy lever to pull in order to quickly reverse their consistently negative Net Profit performance over the past half-decade - by simply implementing a reallocation of priorities at the conglomerate, both in terms of setting incentives (i.e. KPIs) as well as optimal capital allocation (which we’ve explored in Part 1).
BJCORP has not been paying dividends to its own shareholders for the past half-decade; most of its Dividends paid occurred at the Non-controlling interest level (i.e. dividends paid by their subsidiaries to their shareholders).
Next week, we will at long last be wrapping up this month-long deep-dive analysis of BJCORP in Part 4 - and finally explore how BJCORP might be able to achieve their much-vaunted post-turnaround 3,000% upside.
Now that we have comprehensively explored BJCORP’s financial past, we’re ready to look towards the future - and try to identify what kind of exciting new adventures might await them. In my upcoming Part 4 report, we will do a similar but abridged version of the three statement analysis for all of BJCORP’s relevant Berjaya listed subsidiaries - which together with Part 2, will provide operational context for what their current business capabilities are today; and how they can best reorganize their business assets to exploit the opportunities lying dormant in the Wild West of the post-pandemic Digital New World.
By this time next week, we will at long last gather the entire comprehensive point-of-view that we’ve developed on BJCORP over the past few weeks....
In short buying, too many assets and not utilizing them productively, too many loans and cashflows received used to reduce debts. Nothing left for shareholders. Therefore investors are not keen on this counter. All these forays are mainly financed by Sports Toto.
Does it matter u receive Rm 80 or Rm 150 gift, if u r a serious investor leh!?
Just imagine if u have 100 shares of bjcorp worth only Rm 25, But u r entitle to a gift of rm 150...it is very wasteful for bjcorp mah!
It is bcos of this principle, Raider complained to Bjcorp asking him to raise the entitlement to at least above 100,000 shares b4 the shareholderrs can entitle to the get Rm 150 gift mah!.
And for those that hold less than 1000 shares should not get anything loh!
Those who hold between 1000 shares to 10000 shares should only get a token Rm 15 only loh!
Those hold between 10,000 to 100,000 should get Rm 20 loh!
Only those who hold more than 100,000 shares, should be entitle to Rm 150 mah!
But VT being kind person rejected raider suggestion, he thinks bjcorp should not discriminate agst shareholders mah!
But in order to save cost he cut the gift from Rm 150 to Rm 80 mah!
If Raider have my way....Bjcorp should not give so much generous goodies loh!
The best reward for shareholder is bjcorp start generating good profit mah, the goodies given should not be a good criteria of rewarding shareholder bcos this will lead to abuses mah!
Lu tau boh ?
Posted by scanluver > Jan 10, 2022 1:30 PM | Report Abuse
Here you go, Macha. It's RM80. Stop bluffing :D
kahhoeng Asia88, you should email media@berjaya.com.my if you haven't received it. the door gift is only RM 80, I was mistaken by stockraider and assumed it's RM 150 when the newspaper said it's RM 80.
got RM80 voucher. not bad lo. just that they need to ensure the staff know about this apps. When i visit one of the krispy kreme shop, they say what's this apps.
EQUITY ✨ BJCORP and the Mythical 3,000% Upside - Part 4 How BJCORP can potentially challenge Shopee Malaysia for the domestic e-commerce marketplace crown
Aaron Pek Jan 17
Over the past several equity research reports about BJCORP, we explored the conservative base-case investment thesis for BJCORP with a 300% upside - and performed a deep-dive three statement analysis into the conglomerate.
However, until now we have omitted the low-probability blue-sky scenario investment thesis with a 3,000% upside - which we first discussed in Part 1. However the stratospheric upside warrants that we at least explore its feasibility.
In this report, we shall do some spelunking into how BJCORP could potentially pull together the dizzying array of business assets under its stable to form a credible challenger to the domestic e-commerce arm of SEA Ltd - Shopee Malaysia.
We also perform a cursory valuation analysis which attempts to determine whether attaining a 3,000% upside in this scenario is realistic or not. Spoiler: it is.
In my Part 1 report, we saw how BJCORP’s newly minted CEO Jalil publicly opined in a radio interview that he thought BJCORP’s intrinsic value was worth closer to RM 7.50 per share. The obvious spanner in the works here is that that valuation stands in stark contrast to BJCORP’s current share price of just RM 0.25 per share - implying that there exists a potential 3,000% upside.
Since then, I’ve also been repeatedly hinting at how I thought that one of their listed Berjaya companies SEM (7-11 Malaysia) was the Rosetta Stone under Berjaya’s huge stable of assets which could potentially unlock this magnificent upside. Just to illustrate how colossal a 3,000% upside is, that’s a 222% CAGR even if it took them 10 years to unlock this stratospheric valuation. You could invest $50,000 today and retire a millionaire (post-inflation) after 10 years - without having to lift a finger in between.
In this final conclusion to wrap up our bottomless analysis into BJCORP over the past month, we are going to explore how this mythical otherworldly upside could potentially be achieved.
However, before we do that, I need to highlight something first. If you recall, my BJCORP investment thesis in Part 1 did not promise a 3,000% return - in fact, it merely justified how an investor in BJCORP’s shares today could achieve a 300% return. That stark 10x gap was the difference between the latter’s base-case scenario’s valuation, and the former’s blue-sky scenario’s valuation.
Hence, while I do think that it is possible for BJCORP to attain its fabled 3,000% upside, I want to make it clear that I’m not saying that it is definitely going to happen. While I’m pretty confident about the investment thesis behind the 300% upside, I only believe that this 3,000% upside thesis is just that - a blue-sky scenario investment thesis. It will work in the best of circumstances where all the stars align, but you shouldn’t be counting your chickens on it hatching.
Having said that, we don’t even need this 3,000% upside to materialize in order to justify an investment in BJCORP’s shares today. Remember, the 300% upside thesis is fairly likely to materialize - as I’ve quite clearly demonstrated in Part 1. Furthermore, as I’ve also shown there, there is also very little risk inherent in the investment idea on top of that. Just because we only get a 300% upside and not 3,000% doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t be grinning from ear-to-ear - that’s still a 5-year CAGR of 25%.
However, as we’ll see below, neither does that mean that the potential for a 3,000% upside is unlikely. In fact, I think there’s a pretty decent chance of it, even if it doesn’t actually end up materializing. Like I mentioned earlier, all I’m saying is don’t count your chickens before they hatch. Only expect a 300% upside from this investment - but if you do eventually get the 3,000% upside, consider that a bonus from papa Buffett.
py1818 Tks for your daily bulletin. BCorp has made another U-turn as unable to convincingly break resistant 0.27 earlier, already touched 0.245 today.. Will it reach support 0.23 soon? BCorp at its best is only a trading stock, will never qualify for long term investment grade until it pays dividends, shows sustained & convincing profits..
Where is super hero Jalil? Everything's so quiet that you can almost hear a pin drops...where are the Promoters? Even VT is dumping?
py1818 * @earlyretirement @sailang_now @bulldog BjCorp Highest price 0.50 Resistant 0.39 Resistant 0.35 Major resistant 0.335 Major resistant 0.31 Resistant 0.29 Resistant 0.27 Price 0.245 Support 0.23 Verdict - A big UTURN has happened.
How to use buletin. If price go below support, downtrend. If price go above resistant, uptrend
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This book is the result of the author's many years of experience and observation throughout his 26 years in the stockbroking industry. It was written for general public to learn to invest based on facts and not on fantasies or hearsay....
uncensored
2,694 posts
Posted by uncensored > 2021-12-20 13:29 | Report Abuse
don't listen to liar stockraider he is a liar who simply talk hahaha