In Insas 'case, relying mostly on shareholders equity instead of bank borrowings, the company is also bankrupt proof. With minimal gearing, it can survive almost any black swan events, and clean up aftewards.
Insas is a public listed company as you can buy and sell Insas shares in open market. This is fact and Dato' Sri Thong and PAC officially only owned 32.96% is also a fact and Insas cannot do further SBB as this will trigger 33% MGO threshold is also a fact.
Insas Net Financial assets:RM 1,418,421,000 is also fact as it is subject to yearly audit.
Insas still hold 537,008,575 inari share (one of Insas associate company) and 1,215,718,665 M&A an effective holding of 60.83% subsidiary company of Insas.
What I trying to say is Market can never be efficient, that is why we are here to take advantage of market inefficient. But remember market can be irrational longer than you can remain solvent.
sslee this type of companies like INSAS are very problematic.
Most Dome outlets only 30% full when next door more expensive Coffee Bean / Starbucks is fully packed with long queue. People prefer to queue and wait and pay more expensive rather than go inside cheaper Dome. Looks like general public had blacklisted most Dome outlets. There must be a clear and present reason why there is a disparity in business attraction.
Dome is managed by Melium Group. Insas actually welcome any SDN BHD with a viable business to approach them for seed money and financial support to expand them (to a certain size) with the aim of listing them once they are able to qualify for listing. After listing then the listed entity will tap into capital market for further expansion independent on Insas.
Insas could be well legitimate business with many assets and cash rich, that is the reason why I thanked @dumbMoney for his simple explanation that corrected my perception. The issue is unlocking assets on his own will be difficult. It's his lifelong handwork. He will fight till last drop of his blood for those want to dismantle his business. If you read further, he wants his next generation to continue to guard his business.
You can see how iCAP of which is such a tiny small fund will go all out to names calling, calling people learning nothing good from #1 MBA school in the world and writing rubbish here.
TBB will hold capA before covid 19 and will still dumb dumb hold capA till suspension and delist. There is no value investing from TBB. He is just a thick skin trying to hold on the icap management and earned his undeserved management fees.
Nobody even talked about closing his fund down but only talking about probability on theoretical realizable of NAV with 75% approval with special resolutions. People only talked about ordinary resolutions like normal appointment of BODs already created the hallucinations of Brutus conspiracy.
>>>>> TBB will hold capA before covid 19 and will still dumb dumb hold capA till suspension and delist. There is no value investing from TBB. He is just a thick skin trying to hold on the icap management and earned his undeserved management fees. >>>>>
For a value investing fund, its ROE has been declining over the past 10 years. I used to own it but sold it when I found that it seemed to be resting on its past performance
Unlocking value from conglomerate sometimes sounds very lucrative, in reality a long, lonely journey. Either strike gold or go home empty handed.
iCAP fund manager advocated a similar thesis called Malayan United Industries. (MUI - stock code 3891)in 2008. MUI was actively raising cash by disposing Corus hotels, turning around Metrojaya department store and also owned 34% in Laura Ashley.
At that point of time, iCapital.biz publishers and its associates also owned the shares. The price when they wrote that piece was $M0.25/share. Last checked $0.06/share, - 76% over a period of 15 years.
They wrote that the market was grossly misrepresent the potential of MUI turnaround. As at 31 December 2007, MUI has RM 830 mln long term borrowings and RM 778 ml worth of cash and cash equivalents.
MUI also has properties worth RM 1.12 bln, mainly carried at net book value. Out of this RM 1.12 bln, RM 781 mln represents the value of the hotels in the UK, carried at 2001’s cost, and RM 118 mln represents the value of the group’s hotels in Malaysia and Australia.
They also have 1,100 acres of underdeveloped land in Bandar Springhill(around RM 100 mln @ 1995’s value), Menanra PMI(RM 30.8 mln), and other lands and buildings. The group’s crown jewel, the Corus Hyde Park Hotel, alone worth close to RM 600 mln at the current value.
All these they argued provided investors with a margin of safety.
Investors basically got free Laura Ashley with the price they paid.
I have not checked the details of the fundamental after 15 years, surely they still have billions of assets. Is the market still insanely punishing MUI?
@dumbMoney, I won't poke you with a pen, I will hug you when I see you at the hall way🤗
@ Observatory, thanks for the appreciation. Don't be just a silent reader, please feel free to chip in to geh poh a bit....make the chat room more lively a bit😂😂
You must differentiate what is liquid and illiquid assets and how many % controlling shareholder and PAC is holding.
If controlling shareholder already hold more than 50% like in MUI case then minority shareholders have no chance to unlock value since controlling shareholders is in total controlled.
Insas case is different liquid assets Net Financial assets: RM 1,418,421,000 and Insas still hold 537,008,575 inari share (one of Insas associate company) and 1,215,718,665 M&A an effective holding of 60.83% subsidiary company of Insas.
The controlling shareholders Dato Sri Thong and PAC only officially hold 32.96%. So in theory if anyone have a deep pocket he can accumulate insas share from open market to wrest control from Dato' Sri Thong and become the new controlling shareholder and unlock Insas value.
Batikman told every Tom, Dick, and Harry to steamline Berjaya group business bjcorp should take bjland private. But the moustache man did not do so but sold down bjcorp holding in bjland to comply with shareholders spread.
Berjaya is even worse. I always rank companies by their F&B outlets if they have any.
for Berjaya Wendy, you go order, gives order at cashier counter.... the cashier screams at you... Apa? you repeat order, cashier screams louder Apa? Apa? you repeat order, cashier screams like Airbus even louder Apa? Apa? Apa?
suddenly you realise whole restaurant is empty. I just left the KLCC Wendy outlet and never went back. Took 1 year for Wendy KLCC to shut down. Shortly thereafter, entire Wendy ops in Malaysia shutdown. A entire city of customers for Wendy in KLCC but unfortunately, staff refused to take any orders.
At least in Dome, staff pretended to take your orders which never came but wanted money for missing food. 🤣
@Sslee With Insas, it is a more a case of the major shareholder being against conventional wisdom (I won't want to use the word irrational here, he must have his own reasons), which would suggest that the company do a SBB to capture the price discount, but as you said, that would trigger the MGO. The other shareholders can do whatever they please with their shares in the market, up or down, none of his concern. For bargain hunters, with liquidation out of the question at the moment, the only possible play out there is a low ball selective capital reduction by the owner taking the company private, at whatever level he thinks he can get away with.
The takeover defense for the Insas owner is his holdings of warrants, which he can exercise should the need arises. Their historical low cost would not raise his MGO price even if triggered, whereas any new comer will first need to build up a bigger shareholding than his from scratch, from the limited float in the market, and at what price if the MGO is triggered, as the former is already at the MGO threshold, to be bigger than this will exceed the threshold. And the owner can easily do a selective capital reduction offer from the cash hoard within the company to counter the GO, so no problem with the financing, but a GO will need to be fully financed by the offeror. Definitely a much tougher nut to crack than iCap here, haha.
You don't even need to be substantial shareholder to stand for election as director to any listed company board on Bursa by virtue of one of the listing rules. But getting elected is another matter, as that will need a majority vote of support.
sslee you are still confused. You NEVER share your wife or your management fee with others .....
Sslee
Repost from Insas forum. To be fair Dato' Sri Thong and BOD is building and accumulate wealth into Insas. They need to relearn beside accumulate wealth into Insas also need to share the Insas wealth with Insas shareholders.
@observatory The stockbroking community in Kuala Lumpur is not that big, so we are pretty familiar with the players in town. The problem with Insas is that accounting rules require it to mark to market all its listed investments, so every quarter, the fluctuations in value of the listed investments overshadow its reported earnings, making it near impossible to follow by analysts. If only these are unlisted, then things would be simpler.
While the company took the trouble to invite foreign experts to analyse and explain the price discount, they have missed the elephant in the room, which any first year finance student would be able to spot. Yes, you don't need a MBA for that. It is right there in page 6 of the annual report, Table 4 and Table 5, historical returns of NAV and share price from inception to financial year end 2023. Table 5 shows the CAGR of NAV and share price, which are the compounded annual growth rate of the two metrics, similar to the internal rate of returns generated by the investment. For NAV, the CAGR has ranged from a high of 44.65% in 2007 to a low of 7.69 in 2022, and ending with 7.74 in 2023. For share price, the range is from a high of 54.93 in 2007 to a low of 4.84 in 2022 and ending at 4.9 in 2023. From these figures, the actual NAV and share price for the respective years can be calculated and the price/book discount derived. In 2007, the year with the peak CAGR's, share price was traded at a premium, but CAGR started declining after that, with the share price following. Plotted together, there is a very strong correlation coefficient between NAV CAGR and price discount, at R square = 0.86, meaning that up to 86% of the price discount variation can be accounted for by the CAGR, i.e. the declining price discount can be directly traced back to the declining CAGR performance of the fund. Mystery solved. https://1drv.ms/x/s!AgLvGZpm89Yswi_44eGD7tZQhA9y
Yeah Its just Amazon valuation at work one of those 500 methods of valuation by Professor Damodaran iCap Growth Rate had committed suicide => iCap is over valued.
since 100% cannot breakup. Conclusion => Its a SELL
Fundamental analysis (FA) Fundamental analysts study anything that can affect the stock's value, including macroeconomic factors (e.g. economy and industry conditions) and microeconomic factors (e.g. financial conditions and company management). The end goal of fundamental analysis is to produce a quantitative value (Intrinsic Value) that an investor can compare with a stock's current market price, thus indicating whether the stock is undervalued or overvalued. Fundamental analysis is a method of evaluating a stock in an attempt to assess its intrinsic value.
In summary Fundamental Analysis cover:
QUANTITATIVE Financial data/ratio contain in current and past financial report.
QUALITIVE Economy condition (Current and future) Industry condition (Current and future) Company management (Current and future) Profit growth prospect (Current and future) In short what many people term as Business Sense (BS) is actually the qualitative part of Fundamental Analysis. BS is subset of FA.
Definition: Intrinsic value is the Present value of the investment of all the expected cash flow over the lifetime discounted at the appropriate discount rate.
Intrinsic value = (CF1/ (1+d)^1) + (CF2/(1+d)^2) + ----- +(CFn/(1+d)^n)
Where: CF = Cash Flow in the Period d = Discount rate n = The period number This Intrinsic value is actually a Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Example of intrinsic value of INSAS is then the Sum of DCF expected cash flow from varies business streams. For INSAS financial assets rich case, it is my opinion that the liquid assets minus total liabilities should be added to this intrinsic value.
By the way do you think without yearly positive cash flow can Insas accumulate Net Financial assets: RM 1,418,421,000 and Insas still hold 537,008,575 inari share (one of Insas associate company) and 1,215,718,665 M&A an effective holding of 60.83% subsidiary company of Insas
The problem with Insas is once MGO trigger then the independent advisor will do a valuation and advise shareholders to accept or reject the offer based on is the offer fair/unfair and reasonable/unreasonable.
No prize guessing what will be the outcome.
Shareholders can only hope that insas value can be unlock by better dividend and a dividend policy.
@Sslee Berkshire does not have a dividend policy because it believes it can earn a better return than in the hands of the shareholders, and the M&M dividend irrelevance theorem says that shareholders can create their own synthetic dividend by selling the increased value shares in the market if they need the cash flow. It is substituting growth rate as the valuation metric instead of dividend yield, which has served the investors well all these years. Also, doing a SBB is one way of putting cash back in the hands of shareholders, which under US taxation system, is more favorable as long term capital gains than regular dividend in the hands of shareholders. A dollar earned by the company theoretically increase the NAV by a dollar, which can be either retained as retained earnings on the books, or given out to shareholders as bonus issue or dividend, This has no effect on what the company is earning on its operations, the main determination of its value. How that is financed determines the average cost of capital of the firm, how it is sliced and diced among the various stakeholders. The firm can always borrow to finance new investments and pay dividend at the same time, no problem, so cash flow is not critical, if business is good,
BTW, I do have a very small position in Insas, just park it there and don't look at the share price, just look at the earnings reports along with that of Inari. With a PER below 5, it is giving an earnings yield of 20%, which if maintained, is far better than the compounding calculations used by iCap at 15%, when its historic rate has dropped down to below 5%. I can benefit in two ways, if business remains unchanged, my shareholders equity is compounding at the rate of 20% based on my cost of investment, and a possible re-rating of the low PE, which just merely going from 5 x to still a very cheap 6 x, is a 20% increase in share price, without any change in earnings prospect. If interest rates will reverse direction in the near future, the cost of equity capital will also drop along with the risk free rate. Battered down shares will be the first to benefit, being the low hanging fruits.
Very basic calculations. Insas has a ROE of 5%, nothing to brag about, but if I can buy the shares at 25% of book value, my ROI becomes 5%/.25 = 20%. How many listed companies can give you that? So just treat it as a long term investment, as a silent business partner in a private company. I am sure if iCap can present the same kind of numbers, very few people will be taking pot shot at management here. At least I won't.
iCapital invested in BIoalpha Holdings Bhd, which is listed in ACE market segment on Bursa Malaysia. This FM proudly state low risk high return. There is very liquiduty for ACE market or Bioalpha. Today, 10-November, seem Nil transaction for Bioalpha TTB has outsized ego. 11-11-23 What does TTB have in common with APPLE, Steve Woziak. I do not know whether to cry or laugh
Based on the historical back testing data by @dumbMoney......The fund manager will need his magic hands to do 30% CAGR at least 3 years in a row to convince he still has the Midas touch....PAR
Evan at 25% CAGR, people will give him markah kesian with 10% discounts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plotted together, there is a very strong correlation coefficient between NAV CAGR and price discount, at R square = 0.86, meaning that up to 86% of the price discount variation can be accounted for by the CAGR, i.e. the declining price discount can be directly traced back to the declining CAGR performance of the fund. Mystery solved. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
U need to understand this very important point loh!
" Insas strength is a very strong incubator of business loh!"
Thats why u have Inari, M&A in respect of Insas & Microlink in respect of Omesti loh!
All these private equity type of business had contributed billions of profit to insas mah!
In fact Insas is a msia equivalent of Black Rock & Goldman Sachs of the USA loh!
Posted by Sslee > 1 day ago | Report Abuse
Dato' Sri Thong family (daughter and son) have long history in Omesti and microlink. Insas holding in Omesti is recorded as one of the Financial assets at fair value through profit or loss.
Posted by Sslee > 1 day ago | Report Abuse
Dato' Sri Thong family (daughter and son) have long history in Omesti and microlink. Insas holding in Omesti is recorded as one of the Financial assets at fair value through profit or loss.
The simple historical data provided by page 6 of the annual report turns out to be a treasure trove for data mining. In the prospectus of iCap, the CAGR track record of CDAM before the IPO was 22.32% from Apr 1998 to Dec 2004. The historical average for the various holding periods since IPO for NAV and share price are 14.35 and 11.97% respectively. Still a very commendable performance on face value, though no where near the pre IPO track record. Using these two numbers, the theoretical current NAV value and share price after holding the shares for 17 complete years would be $9.77 and $6.83 respectively. But the actual values achieved are only $3.723 and $2.322. What went wrong? Well, in stock markets, there is always this thing called risk or volatility. It is not as simple as straight compounding every year with the average CAGR. A very simple illustration, for a price to go from $1 to $2, it is a 100% gain, then if it drops back down to $1, that is a 50% drop, so the simple arithmetic average performance for the two years is (100+(-50))/2=25%, but the CAGR is 0%, because there is no net gain for the two years. In iCap's case, instead of the CAGR reverting to the mean, it is falling away from the mean towards the low end of the historical numbers, as shown in Chart 2 in the attached link. The more interesting bit from the data is the myth of iCap being a low risk high returns investment. Risk is measured by price fluctuations, especially those on the down side, so for conservative investors, even though the price fluctuation may be the same 5%, a 5% drop is not symmetrical with a 5% gains in terms of utility, so any time an investment may drop in price, it is considered risky. What is low risk then? EPF for one. Even though the dividend rates vary from year to year, it has never been negative and so far, can be considered risk free, and well above bank FD rates, so that can be used as the benchmark for what a conservative investor can set as the bar for investing. Out of curiosity, I looked up the EPF rates for the same years as iCap and surprise surprise, it turns out to be higher than holding iCap share, on a price basis, $2.77 vs 2.322 for iCap. The actual rate for EPF for 2023 has not been announced yet, so I just use the average rate as the naive assumed rate. The results are shown in Chart 3 here. https://1drv.ms/x/s!AgLvGZpm89Yswj5uA3ZQnXnYvBzF?e=FDFkvg
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This book is the result of the author's many years of experience and observation throughout his 26 years in the stockbroking industry. It was written for general public to learn to invest based on facts and not on fantasies or hearsay....
dumbMoney
761 posts
Posted by dumbMoney > 2023-11-07 22:08 | Report Abuse
In Insas 'case, relying mostly on shareholders equity instead of bank borrowings, the company is also bankrupt proof. With minimal gearing, it can survive almost any black swan events, and clean up aftewards.